

1936 Supplement
To
Mason's Minnesota Statutes
1927

(1927 to 1936)
(Superseding Mason's 1931 and 1934 Supplements)

Containing the text of the acts of the 1929, 1931, 1933 and 1935 General Sessions, and the 1933-34 and 1935-36 Special Sessions of the Legislature, both new and amendatory, and notes showing repeals, together with annotations from the various courts, state and federal, and the opinions of the Attorney General, construing the constitution, statutes, charters and court rules of Minnesota together with digest of all common law decisions.



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contempt is reviewable on appeal. *Proper v. P.*, 188M15, 246NW481. See Dun. Dig. 1395, 1702 to 1708a.

9796. Arrest—Order to show cause, etc.

Information for contempt by a juror in willfully concealing her interest in a criminal prosecution, as a result of which she was accepted as a juror, held sufficient. *U. S. v. Clark*, (DC-Minn), 1FSupp747. Aff'd 61F (2d)695, 289US1, 53SCR465.

9798. Admission to bail.

Where warrant does not state whether or not person shall be admitted to bail and defendant is before court, court has jurisdiction. *State v. Binder*, 190M305, 251NW 665, overruling *Papke v. Papke*, 30 Minn. 260, 262, 15NW 117. See Dun. Dig. 1706.

9801. Hearing.

In cases of strictly criminal contempt, rules of law and evidence applied in criminal cases must be observed, and defendant's guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. *State v. Binder*, 190M305, 251NW665. See Dun. Dig. 1705.

9802. Penalties for contempt of court.—Upon the evidence so taken, the court or officer shall determine the guilt or innocence of the person proceeded against, and, if he is adjudged guilty of the contempt charged, he shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$250.00, or by imprisonment in the county jail, workhouse or work farm for not more than six months, or by both. But in case of his inability to pay the fine or endure the imprisonment, he may be relieved by the court or officer in such manner and upon such terms as may be just. (R. L. '05, §4648; G. S. '13, §8363; Apr. 15, 1933, c. 267.)

Contempt is not a "crime" within §9934, and, in view of §9802, punishment can only be by imprisonment in county jail and not in a workhouse. 175M57, 220NW414.

9803. Indemnity to injured party.

Postnuptial agreements properly made between husband and wife after a separation, are not contrary to public policy, but the parties cannot, by a postnuptial agreement, oust the court of jurisdiction to award alimony or to punish for contempt a failure to comply with the judgment, though it followed the agreement. 178M 75, 226NW211.

Fines for contempt as indemnity to a party in an action. 16MinnLawRev791.

9804. Imprisonment until performance.

A proceeding to coerce payment of money is for a civil contempt. Imprisonment cannot be imposed on one who is unable to pay. 173M100, 216NW606.

Payment of alimony and attorney's fees. 178M75, 226 NW701.

A lawful judicial command to a corporation is in effect a command to its officers, who may be punished for contempt for disobedience to its terms. 181M559, 233NW 586. See Dun. Dig. 1708.

Father of a bastard cannot be punished for contempt in not obeying an order to save money which it is not in his power to obey. *State v. Strong*, 192M420, 256NW 900. See Dun. Dig. 850, 1703.

9807. Hearing.

It is not against public policy to receive testimony of jurors in a proceeding for contempt of one of the jurors in obtaining her acceptance on the jury by willful concealment of her interest in the case. *U. S. v. Clark*, (DC-Minn), 1FSupp747. Aff'd 61F(2d)695, aff'd 289US1, 53SCR465.

CHAPTER 92

Witnesses and Evidence

WITNESSES

9808. Definition.

Testimony on former trial admissible where witness absent from state. 171M216, 213NW902.

Whether collateral matters may be proved to discredit a witness is within the discretion of the trial court. 171 M515, 213NW923.

The foundation for expert testimony is largely a matter within the discretion of the trial court. *Dumbeck v. C.*, 177M261, 225NW111.

Where a witness is able to testify to the material facts from his own recollection, it is not prejudicial error to refuse to permit him to refer to a memorandum in order to refresh his memory. *Bullock v. N.*, 182M192, 233NW858. See Dun. State v. Novak, 181M504, 233NW 309. See Dun. Dig. 10344a.

There was no violation of the parol evidence rule in admitting testimony to identify the party with whom defendant contracted, the written contract being ambiguous and uncertain. *Drabeck v. W.*, 182M217, 234NW 6. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

After prima facie proof that the person who negotiated the contract the defendant signed was the agent of plaintiff, evidence of such person's declarations or statements during the negotiation was admissible. *Drabeck v. W.*, 182M217, 234NW6. See Dun. Dig. 3393.

Letter written by expert witness contrary to his testimony, held admissible. *Jensen v. M.*, 185M284, 240NW 656. See Dun. Dig. 3343.

9809. Subpoena, by whom issued.

Power of trial judge to summon witnesses. 15Minn LawRev350.

9810. How served.

A subpoena issued by Senate investigation committee sent to person for whom it is intended by registered mail is of no effect. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Apr. 12, 1933.

Subpoena to appear before senate committee must be served by an individual and one sent by registered mail is without effect. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Apr. 12, 1933.

Secretary of conservation commission could not be required by subpoena to produce all of his correspondence with certain official before committee of senate making investigation. *Id.*

9814. Examination of clergyman restricted in certain cases.—Every person of sufficient understanding, including a party, may testify in any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in court or before any person who has authority to receive evidence, except as follows:

* * * * *

3. A clergyman or other minister of any religion shall not, without the consent of the party making

the confession, be allowed to disclose a confession made to him in his professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or practice of the religious body to which he belongs. Nor shall a clergyman or other minister of any religion be examined as to any communication made to him by any person seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid or comfort or his advice given thereon in the course of his professional character, without the consent of such person. (Act Apr. 18, 1931, c. 206, §1.)

* * * * *

½. In general.

A justified disbelief in the testimony of a witness does not justify a finding of a fact to the contrary without evidence in its support. *State v. Novak*, 181M504, 233NW309. See Dun. Dig. 10344a.

The court did not err in excluding the opinion of plaintiff's expert as to values. *Carl Lindquist & Carlson, Inc., v. J.*, 182M529, 235NW267. See Dun. Dig. 3322.

Owner's opinion of the value of his house as it would have been if plaintiff's work had been properly done, was admissible. *Carl Lindquist & Carlson, Inc., v. J.*, 182M529, 235NW267. See Dun. Dig. 3322(4).

There was no error in permitting the mother of the three-year-old child who was injured to testify as to the indications the child gave of injury at the time of the accident, nor as to the duration of its disability. *Ball v. G.*, 185M105, 240NW100. See Dun. Dig. 3232.

3. Subdivision 1.

Not applicable in action by wife to set aside conveyance obtained by fraud of husband. 173M51, 216NW 311.

Prohibition of this subdivision applies in actions for alienation of affections. 175M414, 221NW639.

Plaintiff in action for alienation or criminal conversation could not testify to admissions made to him by his deceased wife concerning meretricious relations with defendant, though defendant requested him to ask his wife about the matter. 177M577, 226NW195.

Husband and wife are competent to give evidence that the former is not the father of a child of the wife conceived before the dissolution of the marriage by divorce. *State v. Soyka*, 181M502, 233NW300. See Dun. Dig. 10312.

Defendant by calling his wife as a witness waived his privilege. *State v. Stearns*, 184M452, 238NW895. See Dun. Dig. 10312(59).

Wife cannot be examined as a witness for or against her husband without his consent. *Albrecht v. P.*, 192M 557, 257NW377. See Dun. Dig. 10312.

4. Subdivision 2.

Volunteering information on the witness stand. 171M 492, 214NW666.

On application to share in grandfather's estate on ground of unintentional omission from will, communications between testator and attorney who drew will were not privileged. 177M169, 225NW109.

Communications by a testator to attorney drafting his will are not privileged in litigation over estate between persons, all of whom claim under testator. Hanefeld v. F., 191M547, 254NW321. See Dun. Dig. 10313.

4½. Subdivision 3.

For a confession to a clergyman to be privileged it must be penitential in character and made to him in his professional character as such clergyman in confidence while seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid, or comfort, but the court cannot require the disclosure of the confession to determine if it is privileged. In re Swenson, 183M602, 237NW589. See Dun. Dig. 10314.

Statement of the witness held not given by way of confession or in obtaining spiritual comfort or consolation and was not privileged. Christensen v. P., 189M548, 250NW363. See Dun. Dig. 10314a.

Privilege of confidential communications made to clergyman. 16MinnLawRev105.

5. Subdivision 4.

180M205, 230NW648.

Information acquired by a physician in attempting to revive a patient, and opinions based thereon, are within protection of section, although patient may have been dead when such attempts were made. Palmer v. O., 187M272, 245NW146. See Dun. Dig. 10314.

A doctor may testify that he has been consulted but he may not against objection disclose any information which he obtained at such consultation. Stone v. S., 189M47, 248NW285. See Dun. Dig. 10314.

Communications between superintendent of state hospital and patient are privileged. Op. Atty. Gen., May 9, 1933.

6. Subdivision 5.

Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. C., 183M1, 235NW634. See Dun. Dig. 10315(20).

Court properly sustained objection to question asked prosecuting attorney with respect to a disclosure made to him by an accomplice of accused who testified against defendant, though proper foundation was laid for impeachment. 172M106, 214NW782.

City clerk may withhold from public inspection letters and papers which are not a part of regular files and records prescribed or required to be kept by law, or consist of communications made to city clerk or other official in official confidence and public interest would suffer by their inspection or disclosure. Op. Atty. Gen., Oct. 26, 1933.

Confidential information given to child welfare board should be classed as privilege and its disclosure would be contrary to public interest. Op. Atty. Gen., Dec. 29, 1933.

Public records of a municipality are open to inspection by any citizen of the state. Op. Atty. Gen. (59a-6), Apr. 27, 1934.

Subject to this subdivision records of state department of education and of public schools are open to any taxpayer. Op. Atty. Gen. (8511), Apr. 2, 1935.

9815. Accused.

2. Cross-examination of accused.

Statement of defendant in cross-examination that he never robbed anybody does not put his general character in issue. 181M566, 233NW307. See Dun. Dig. 2458.

There was no error in cross-examination of defendant because it tended to subject him to prejudice on account of his associations and earlier career. State v. Quinn, 186M242, 243NW70.

A defendant in a criminal case, who is a witness in his own behalf, may be cross-examined upon collateral matters to affect his credibility and to discredit him, and to some extent state may inquire into his past life, and extent of the cross-examination is largely within discretion of trial court. State v. McTague, 190M449, 252NW446. See Dun. Dig. 10307, 10309.

9816. Examination by adverse party.

1. Object and effect of statute.

The record does not show that appellant had any ground for complaint because of the ruling of court denying him the right to cross-examine his co-defendant while the latter was still on the stand after cross-examination under the statute by respondent's attorney. Lund v. O., 182M204, 234NW310. See Dun. Dig. 10327.

2. Who may be called.

In action against railroad there was no error in permitting a district master car builder to be called by plaintiff for cross-examination, even though not occupying the same position as at the time the cause of action arose. 175M197, 220NW602.

In a proceeding for discipline and disbarment of an attorney, he may be called for cross-examination under the statute. In re Halvorson, 175M520, 221NW907.

Defendant in default of an answer could be called under the statute. 176M108, 222NW576.

A railway section foreman held properly called for cross-examination in action against railroad. 176M331, 223NW605.

Attorney involved in transaction, but not a party, held improperly called under this section. 180M104, 230NW277.

In action against owner of truck, it was not reversible error to permit driver of truck to be called for cross-examination under statute. Ludwig v. H., 187M315, 245NW371. See Dun. Dig. 10327.

Where summons and complaint were properly served on a minor and he interposed an answer by his attorney before any guardian ad litem had been appointed for him and on day of trial a guardian ad litem was appointed, such defendant was an actual defendant at the trial who could be called for cross-examination as an adverse party. Wagstrom v. J., 192M220, 255NW822. See Dun. Dig. 4454, 4462.

Even though a minor defendant were not a proper party defendant, it was not prejudicial error to permit him to be called for cross-examination under the statute, as he could have been called as a witness for plaintiff and court would have permitted a cross-examination irrespective of the statute. Id. See Dun. Dig. 422, 10327.

3. In what actions or proceedings.

Defendant in bastardy proceeding may be called and examined. Op. Atty. Gen., Aug. 30, 1929.

A bastardy proceeding is a civil proceeding, not a criminal action, and defendant may be called by prosecution for cross-examination. State v. Jeffrey, 188M476, 247NW692. See Dun. Dig. 10327d.

4. Scope of examination.

In action against driver of an automobile and his alleged employer for injuries sustained in a collision, in which driver admitted alleged employment in his pleadings, held it was improper to permit cross-examination of driver as an adverse party upon issue of employment. P. F. Collier & Son v. H. (USCCA8), 72F(2d)625. See Dun. Dig. 10327.

5. Contradiction and impeachment of witness.

A party calling the adverse party under this section, and failing to obtain the proof sought, held not entitled to favorable decision on assumption that the testimony given was false. 178M568, 227NW896.

9817. Conversation with deceased or insane person.

1. Who incompetent.

175M549, 221NW908.

In action to enjoin barring of right of way claimed by prescription, defendant and her children had such an interest in the subject-matter that they could not testify as to conversations between plaintiff and their deceased husband and father regarding the right of way. 171M353, 214NW49.

Plaintiff in action for alienation or criminal conversation could not testify to admissions made to him by his deceased wife concerning meretricious relations with defendant, though defendant requested him to ask his wife about the matter. 177M577, 226NW195.

In action by wife alone to enjoin foreclosure of mortgage executed by husband and wife and cancel note and mortgage for fraud, husband could testify as to a conversation with a person since deceased. 178M452, 227NW501.

New debtor arising by novation was competent to testify to conversation with deceased creditor. 180M75, 230NW468.

Statements made by an injured person, since deceased, to a party or person interested in the outcome of the action, are inadmissible in evidence, and such statements are not rendered admissible in evidence by the fact that they are part of the res gestae, or excepted from the hearsay rule, or classed as verbal acts. Dougherty v. G., 184M436, 239NW153; note under §9657. See Dun. Dig. 10316.

One financially interested in result of law suit may not testify to conversations between deceased and other party. Cohoon v. L., 188M429, 247NW520. See Dun. Dig. 10316b.

1b. Heirs.

A beneficiary under a will may give conversations with the testator for the purpose of laying foundation to testify as to the testator's mental condition. 177M226, 225NW102.

Declarations of a deceased grantor are not admissible in an action by his heirs to set aside the deed because of the alleged undue influence and duress used by the grantee in its procurement; such declarations not being against the interest of the grantor. Reek v. R., 184M532, 239NW599. See Dun. Dig. 10316.

1c. Conversations between deceased and third persons.

Does not exclude testimony of husband of granddaughter and heir as to conversations with decedent. 181M217, 232NW1. See Dun. Dig. 10316.

Court rightly refused to strike as incompetent testimony of a witness not financially interested in suit, that deceased admitted he had agreed to pay his son and daughter for services they were rendering him. Holland v. M., 189M172, 248NW750. See Dun. Dig. 10316b.

Where so-called admission against interest of deceased person is not in respect to specific issue litigated, but rather indirectly or upon a collateral matter, evidence going to contradict or explain same should be admitted. Empenger v. E., 194M219, 261NW185. See Dun. Dig. 3298.

1f. Acts and transactions in general.

As respecting gift of notes by decedent to plaintiff, latter could not testify that deceased handed notes

properly endorsed to him and that he handed them back to decedent to take care of them for him. Quarfot v. S., 189M451, 249NW668. See Dun. Dig. 10316.

Where claimant introduced proof of statements of deceased in respect to a collateral matter, not in nature of a direct admission against interest upon litigated issue, it was error to exclude other statements of deceased to meet or explain the statements introduced. *Empenger v. E.*, 194M219, 259NW795. See Dun. Dig. 3237.

Conveyances made of parts of farm on which parties lived, as one family, were properly received as having some tendency to show existence or nonexistence of a contract to will property to daughter-in-law for services rendered as claimed by claimant, but diaries of deceased containing no entries relative to any issue litigated were not admissible. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 10207.

It is desirable that court be liberal in receiving evidence of collateral matter tending to prove or disprove alleged contract upon which claim against decedent is based, and while admissions against interest by deceased are admissible, self-serving statements are not. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3408.

4. Conversation with whom.

A conversation by an interested party with a third party, if otherwise competent, is not incompetent because overheard by a party since deceased. *Sievers v. S.*, 189M576, 250NW574. See Dun. Dig. 10316.

Insured was necessarily a participant in conversation resulting in contract that if beneficiaries were not changed, named beneficiaries would give proceeds of policy to plaintiffs. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 10316.

5. Waiving objection by cross-examination.

Question to plaintiff by defendant's counsel, held not to open the door so as to permit him to testify generally as to conversations with deceased. 175M27, 220NW154.

7. Waiver.

Objection to competency of witness or evidence cannot be first raised on motion for new trial or on appeal. 178M452, 227NW501.

9819-1. Witnesses in criminal cases.—If a judge of a court of record in any state which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that state to attend and testify in criminal actions in this state certifies under the seal of such court that there is a criminal action pending in such court, that a person being within this state is a material witness in such action, and that his presence will be required for a specified number of days at the trial of such action, upon presentation of such certificate to any judge of the district court of the county in which such person resides, or the county in which such person is found if not a resident of this state, such judge shall fix a time and place for a hearing and shall notify the witness of such time and place.

If at the hearing the judge determines that the witness is material and necessary, either for the prosecution or the defense in such criminal action, that it will not cause undue hardship to the witness to be compelled to attend and testify in the action in the other state, that the witness will not be compelled to travel more than one thousand miles to reach the place of trial by the ordinary traveled route, and that the laws of the state in which the action is pending and of any other state through which the witness may be required to pass by ordinary course of travel will give to him protection from arrest and the service of civil and criminal process, he shall make an order, with a copy of the certificate attached, directing the witness to attend and testify in the court where the action is pending at a time and place specified in the certificate.

If the witness, who is named in such order as above provided after being paid or tendered by some properly authorized person the sum of ten cents a mile for each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court where the action is pending and five dollars for each day that he is required to travel and attend as a witness, fails without good cause to attend and testify as directed by such order, he shall be guilty of constructive contempt of court and shall be punished according to law. (Act Apr. 11, 1935, c. 140, §1.)

9819-2. Nonresident witnesses.—If a person, in any state, which by its laws has made provision for commanding persons within that state to attend and testify either for the prosecution or the defense in criminal actions in this state, is a material witness in an action pending in a district court of this state, a

judge of such court may issue a certificate under the seal of the court stating these facts and specifying the number of days the witness will be required. This certificate shall be presented to a judge of a court of record in the county in which the witness resides, or the county in which he is found if not a resident of that state.

If the witness is ordered by the court to attend and testify in a criminal action in this state he shall be tendered the sum of ten cents a mile for each mile by the ordinary traveled route to and from the court where the action is pending and five dollars for each day that he is required to travel and attend as a witness. A witness who has appeared in accordance with the provisions of the order of the court shall not be required to remain within this state a longer period of time than the period mentioned in the certificate. (Act Apr. 11, 1935, c. 140, §2.)

9819-3. Witnesses not to be subject to arrest or service of process.—If a person comes into this state in obedience to a court order directing him to attend and testify in a criminal action in this state he shall not, while in this state, pursuant to such court order, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state under such order.

If a person passes through this state while going to another state in obedience to a court order requiring him to attend and testify in a criminal action in that state or while returning therefrom, he shall not, while so passing through this state, be subject to arrest or the service of process, civil or criminal, in connection with matters which arose before his entrance into this state pursuant to such court order. (Act Apr. 11, 1935, c. 140, §3.)

9819-4. Interpretation of act.—This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of the states which enact it. (Act Apr. 11, 1935, c. 140, §4.)

DEPOSITIONS

9832. Informalities and defects—Motion to suppress.

Suppression of deposition, held not prejudicial error. 181M217, 232NW1. See Dun. Dig. 422.

Bond was sufficiently identified in deposition of expert witness on value to make his testimony admissible. *Ebacher v. F.*, 188M268, 246NW903. See Dun. Dig. 2715.

PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY

Act to provide for perpetuation of evidence of sales of pledged property. Laws 1931, c. 329, ante, §8359-1.

JUDICIAL RECORDS—STATUTES, ETC.

9851. Records of foreign courts.

Authenticated copy of defendant's record of conviction in another state, if under the same name, is prima facie evidence of identity. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Apr. 28, 1929.

9853. Printed copies of statutes, etc.

Mason's Minnesota Statutes 1927 were made prima facie evidence of the laws therein contained by Laws 1929, c. 6.

When a bill has passed both houses, is enrolled twice, and the enrolled bills are directly contradictory, in one particular, and it is necessary to determine which of the two acts the legislature intended to enact, the court may examine the legislative journals to ascertain the facts. 172M306, 215NW221.

9855. Statutes of other states.

All that is necessary to authenticate a state statute to be used in evidence is to have a copy certified by the Secretary of State under the great seal of the State. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, Dec. 11, 1931.

DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

9859. Affidavit of publication.

In action by administrator to recover purchase price of land, oral testimony offered to show that in the verbal negotiations for the sale the land was described differently from the description in the deed, was properly rejected. *Kehrer v. S.*, 182M596, 235NW386. See Dun. Dig. 3368(48).

9862. Official records prima facie evidence—Certified copies—etc.

Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 14, 1932; note under §9880.

Records of state department of education and of public schools are open to inspection by any taxpayer. Op. Atty. Gen. (8511), Apr. 2, 1935.

LOST INSTRUMENTS

9871. Proof of loss.

Evidence to establish lost deed must be clear and convincing. 181M45, 231NW414.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

9876. Account books—Loose-leaf system, etc.

Entries or memoranda made by third parties in the regular course of business under circumstances calculated to insure accurate and precluding any motive of misrepresentation, are admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts stated. It is no longer an essential of admissibility "that the witness should be somehow unavailable." 174M558, 219NW905.

A hospital chart was properly admitted as an exhibit. Lund v. O., 182M204, 234NW310. See Dun. Dig. 3357(95).
Corporate minute books held sufficiently identified by the testimony of one who was the auditor and a director of the corporation. Johnson v. B., 182M335, 234NW590. See Dun. Dig. 3345(16).

A letter written by one party to a contract, in confirmation of it, in performance of an undisputed term calling for such a letter, accepted without question and retained by the other party, held such an integration of the agreement as to exclude parol evidence varying or contradicting the writing. Rast v. B., 182M392, 235NW372. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

9877. Entries by a person deceased, admissible when.

This section adds nothing to admissibility but declares only what foundation shall be laid. 174M558, 219NW905.

9880. Minutes of conviction and judgment.

In abatement proceedings in district court, where one has been convicted of violation of city liquor ordinance, certified copies of records of municipal court are admissible. Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 14, 1932.

9884. Certificate of conviction.

Op. Atty. Gen., Apr. 14, 1932; note under §9880.

9886. Inspection of documents.

An order granting or refusing inspection of books and documents in hands or under control of an adverse party is not appealable. Melgaard, 187M632, 246NW478. See Dun. Dig. 296a, 298(49).

9887. Bills and notes.—Indorsement, etc.

Promissory note could be introduced in evidence without proof of signature. 176M254, 223NW142.
Verified general denial is insufficient to require other proof than the note itself. 180M279, 230NW735.

9899. Fact of marriage, how proved.

Oral or written admissions of other party that marriage exists are admissible in evidence to show common-law marriage. Ghelin v. J., 186M405, 243NW443. See Dun. Dig. 5794(79).

9903. Uncorroborated evidence of accomplice.

Testimony of accomplices was sufficiently corroborated. 173M598, 218NW117.
Sufficiency of corroboration of accomplice. 176M175, 222NW906.

Where it is in fact present, it is not error to instruct that there is evidence to corroborate an accomplice. 176M175, 222NW906.

A witness is an accomplice if he himself could be convicted as a principal or accessory. One who gives a bribe is not an accomplice to the crime of receiving a bribe. 180M450, 231NW225.

Evidence held not to show that a witness was an accomplice and the court properly refused to charge as to corroboration. 181M303, 232NW335. See Dun. Dig. 2457.

Submitting to the jury as a question of fact the question whether two witnesses for the state were accomplices held not error. State v. Leuzinger, 182M302, 234NW308. See Dun. Dig. 2457(9).

Evidence corroborating testimony of accomplices held sufficient to support the conviction of bank officer for larceny. State v. Leuzinger, 182M302, 234NW308. See Dun. Dig. 2457(1).

In absence of request, instruction on necessity of corroboration of accomplice was properly omitted, under evidence. State v. Quinn, 186M242, 243NW70.

Evidence held not to show witnesses were accomplices. State v. Quinn, 186M242, 243NW70.
Testimony of accomplice held sufficiently corroborated connecting defendant with the crime of arson. State v. Padares, 187M622, 246NW369. See Dun. Dig. 2457.

9904. In prosecutions for libel—Right of jury.

Truth, a defense to libel. 16MinnLawRev43.

9905. Divorce—Testimony of parties.

Evidence held sufficient to establish willful desertion. Graml v. G., 184M324, 238NW683. See Dun. Dig. 2776.

9905 1/2.

COMMON LAW DECISIONS RELATING TO WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE IN GENERAL

1. Judicial notice.

The courts recognize the fact that tuberculosis in its incipient stage is usually not an incurable malady. Egen v. U. S. (CCA8), 58F(2d)616.

It is common knowledge that standard automobiles are held for sale by dealers for schedule prices, even when old or used cars are traded in. Baltrusch v. B., 183M470, 236NW924. See Dun. Dig. 3451.

It is matter of common knowledge that a sterilization operation upon a male properly done in due course effects sterilization. Christensen v. T., 190M123, 255NW620. See Dun. Dig. 3451.

Courts take judicial notice of topography of state. Erickson v. C., 190M433, 252NW219. See Dun. Dig. 3459.

It is common knowledge that recuperative sources differ very much in individuals even of same age and outward appearance. Howard v. V., 191M245, 253NW766. See Dun. Dig. 3451.

The court judicially knows that mail would ordinarily be received at Morris, Minn., one day after it was deposited in St. Paul, Minn. Devenney's Estate, 192M265, 256NW104. See Dun. Dig. 3456.

Court will not take judicial notice of health regulations. Op. Atty. Gen. (225b-4), May 21, 1935.

2. Presumptions and burden of proof.

There is a presumption that death was not suicidal. New York L. I. Co. v. A. (CCA8), 66F(2d)705.

In action against city for flooding of basement, court properly charged that burden of proving that storm or cloud burst was an act of God or vis major was upon the defendant. National Weeklies v. J., 183M150, 235NW905. See Dun. Dig. 7043.

Consumer of bread discovering a dead larva in a slice, which she did not put in her mouth must prove the baker's negligence, and court properly directed verdict for the defendant. Swenson v. P., 183M289, 236NW310. See Dun. Dig. 3782, 7044.

It will be presumed that county officials proceeded to spread and collect taxes as was their duty under statute, though record in suit does not so show. Republic I. & S. Co. v. B., 187M373, 245NW615. See Dun. Dig. 3435.

Absence of proof on a vital issue loses case for party having burden of proof on that issue, no matter how difficult or impossible it is to procure evidence on that particular point. McGerty v. N., 191M443, 254NW601. See Dun. Dig. 3469.

There is a presumption that public officers will conform to the constitution. Moses v. O., 192M173, 255NW617. See Dun. Dig. 3435.

In absence of evidence to contrary, presumption that letter properly addressed and posted with proper postage affixed is received in due course controls. Devenney's Estate, 192M265, 256NW104. See Dun. Dig. 3445.

Legislature is presumed to have acted with knowledge of all facts necessary to make an intelligent classification of persons and things. Board of Education v. B., 192M367, 256NW894. See Dun. Dig. 1677 to 1679.

A public official is entitled to presumption that in performance of his duties he acts in good faith according to his best judgment. Kingsley v. F., 192M468, 257NW95. See Dun. Dig. 3435.

In action for death in elevator shaft to which there were no eye witnesses, sentence at end of charge "with reference to the presumption of due care that accompanied the plaintiff, the burden of overcoming that presumption rests upon the defendant" held not prejudicial in view of accurate and more complete instruction in body of charge. Gross v. G., 194M23, 259NW557. See Dun. Dig. 7032(99).

In action for death by falling into elevator shaft to which there was no eye witness, it is not absolutely necessary for plaintiff to prove precise manner in which deceased came to fall into pit, even if any of alleged negligent acts or omissions have been proven, which reasonably may be found to be cause of fall. Id. See Dun. Dig. 7043.

One who loses his life in an accident is presumed to have exercised due care for his own safety, but presumption may be overcome by ordinary means of proof that due care was not exercised. Oxborough v. M., 194M335, 260NW305. See Dun. Dig. 3431, 7032.

Presumption of due care by decedent yields to credible undisputed evidence. Faber v. H., 194M321, 260NW500. See Dun. Dig. 2616, 7032.

Circumstantial evidence may rebut presumption of due care of a deceased. Id. See Dun. Dig. 2616, 7032.

Guardian of insane insured person who escaped from insane asylum and disappeared cannot continue to receive disability benefits upon a mere presumption of continuance of life and continuance of disability, but must show actual physical existence and continuing disability as required by policy. Opten v. P., 194M580, 261NW197. See Dun. Dig. 3438.

Distinction between risk of non-persuasion and duty of producing evidence. 15MinnLawRev600.

3. —Death from absence.

After seven years' unexplained absence without tidings, absentee is presumed to be no longer living, but there is no presumption that he died at any particular time during seven years, and death at an earlier date

than expiration of period must be proved like any other fact by party asserting it. *Carlson v. E.*, 188M43, 246NW 370. See Dun. Dig. 3434.

Where absentee's marital relations were extremely unhappy, he was insolvent and a drunkard, and had announced his intention of seeking employment elsewhere, jury was not justified in finding death occurred prior to expiration of seven-year period. *Id.*

There is a rebuttable common-law presumption that a person no longer lives who has disappeared and has not been heard from for a period of seven years, and in such a case burden is upon one who seeks to show death prior to expiration of seven-year period, and such a death must be shown by evidence that preponderates in favor of that solution of the disappearance. *Sherman v. M.*, 191M607, 255NW113. See Dun. Dig. 3434.

In a disappearance case, circumstantial evidence may justify a finding of death prior to expiration of seven-year period even in absence of a showing that absentee was exposed to a specific peril at time he was last heard from. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3434.

To give rise to presumption of death after seven year's unexplained absence, such absence must be from last usual place of abode or resort. *White v. P.*, 193M263, 253 NW519. See Dun. Dig. 3434, 4844.

Presumption of death from seven years' absence. 19 *MinnLawRev* 777.

4. —Suppression of evidence.

When a party fails to produce an available witness who has knowledge of facts and whose testimony presumably would be favorable to him, and fails to account for his absence, jury may indulge a presumption or draw an inference unfavorable to such party. *M & M Securities Co. v. D.*, 190M57, 250NW801. See Dun. Dig. 3444.

5. Admissibility in general.

Circumstantial evidence is as competent in a personal injury action as in any other. *Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. P.* (USCCA8), 76F(2d)243.

A witness for plaintiffs was not permitted to testify to declarations of the living grantor impugning the grantees' title, except insofar as such testimony refuted or impeached that given by such grantor. *Reek v. R.*, 184M532, 239NW599. See Dun. Dig. 3417.

Testimony of incidents of dissatisfaction and animosity between grantors and grantees months and years prior to the execution of the deed was properly excluded as immaterial and too remote to affect the issue of duress. *Reek v. R.*, 184M532, 239NW599. See Dun. Dig. 2848.

Evidence of violation of a statute or ordinance which has not been enacted for the protection of the injured person is immaterial. *Mechler v. M.*, 184M476, 239NW605. See Dun. Dig. 6976.

Testimony to show that one defendant had said plaintiff was crazy or foolish was hearsay as to the other defendant, and irrelevant, under the pleadings, as to both defendants. *Kallusch v. K.*, 185M3, 240NW108. See Dun. Dig. 3286, 3287.

It was not error to exclude an opinion of witness already testified to by him. *Supornick v. N.*, 190M19, 250 NW716. See Dun. Dig. 10317.

Plaintiff, in libel, could not testify as to effect of publication on his wife and daughter caused by treatment accorded them, or their conduct and actions in his presence or oral statements to him detailing remarks and conduct of others resulting in their humiliation. *Thorson v. A.*, 190M200, 251NW177. See Dun. Dig. 5555.

It was not error to admit in evidence fragments of bone from plaintiff's skull where there was controversy as to character of injury to her head. *Johnston v. S.*, 190 M269, 251NW525. See Dun. Dig. 3258.

In action on life policy, court did not err in sustaining objection to question to defendant's district manager "do you know whether or not the company would have issued the policy to Mr. D., if it had known that he had been a bootlegger," such manager having nothing to do with approval of applications. *Domico v. M.*, 191M215, 253NW538. See Dun. Dig. 3254.

Where offered testimony is competent and material, its reception is not discretionary with court; there being no objection raised as to proper foundation being laid. *Taylor v. N.*, 192M415, 256NW674. See Dun. Dig. 9728.

Cost of manufacture or production of property is generally held admissible as tending in some degree to establish value. *Fryberger v. A.*, 194M443, 260NW625. See Dun. Dig. 2576a.

6. Admissions.

Oral or written admissions by claimant that she is single and not married are admissible against her on question of common-law marriage. *Ghelin v. J.* 186M405, 243NW443. See Dun. Dig. 5794(79).

Admissions made by an insured after he had transferred to plaintiff's all of his interest in fire insurance policies, covering certain property against loss by fire, are not admissible in evidence to establish defense that insured willfully set fire to property. *True v. C.*, 187M 636, 246NW474. See Dun. Dig. 3417.

Statements of physicians furnished by beneficiary to insurer as part of proof of death of insured are receivable in evidence as admissions of beneficiary. *Elness v. P.*, 190M169, 251NW183. See Dun. Dig. 3410.

Statements made by a physician in proof by husband of his disability, three months before his death, nature of which wife did not know, were not admissible against her when she sued on policy as a beneficiary. *Id.*

A statement made to plaintiff by a mere clerk or salesman in store, immediately after an accident, as to position of a platform, did not bind store or establish any negligence on its part. *Smith v. E.*, 190M294, 251NW265. See Dun. Dig. 3410.

Plaintiff suing employee of garage who at time of accident was driving car of third person on his own private business held not estopped in garnishment to claim liability of liability insurers of such third party by allegations in main action that defendant was operating automobile in business of garage. *Barry v. S.*, 191M71, 253 NW14. See Dun. Dig. 3208.

Effect of an admission by one representing a corporation depends upon whether individual has authority to speak for it. *Peterson v. S.*, 192M315, 256NW308. See Dun. Dig. 3418.

Admissions, if material, are always admissible. *Hork v. M.*, 193M366, 258NW576. See Dun. Dig. 3408.

While it is ordinarily improper for either court or counsel to read pleadings to jury, yet, even without its introduction in evidence, an admission in a pleading may be read to jury in argument for adversary of pleader. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3424, 9783a.

Allegation in answer of an agreement between deceased and husband of claimant, under which parties lived as one family on farm of deceased, cannot be construed into an admission of a contract between deceased and claimant to pay her for services rendered him as a member of household. *Empenger v. E.*, 194M219, 259NW 795. See Dun. Dig. 3424.

Bank suing co-owners of a farm as partners on a note, purporting to be signed by them as a partnership, was not thereafter estopped in a suit by a third party to claim that there was no partnership and that certain co-owner was alone liable on theory of having signed under an assumed name, first action being settled and there being no findings or judgment. *Campbell v. S.*, 194M502, 261NW1. See Dun. Dig. 3218.

Pleadings of a party may be offered in evidence by his opponent to show admission. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3424.

7. Declarations.

Income tax returns made by deceased in which he reported that he was single were admissible as declarations against interest in a proceeding by one against his estate as common-law wife. *Ghelin v. J.*, 186M405, 243 NW443. See Dun. Dig. 5794(79).

Declarations made to hospital and in application for passport and in the execution of a void holographic will were not admissible as evidence of pedigree or as part of res gestae in a controversy by one claiming a common-law marriage with decedent. *Ghelin v. J.*, 186M405, 243NW443. See Dun. Dig. 5794(79).

Declarations in denial of marriage made by other party to third persons not in presence of or acquiesced in by person claiming common-law marriage are inadmissible. *Ghelin v. J.*, 186M405, 243NW443.

One claiming common-law marriage cannot introduce in evidence her own declarations to third persons not made in the presence of or acquiesced in by other party. *Ghelin v. J.*, 186M405, 243NW443. See Dun. Dig. 3287a, 5794(79).

In action under "double indemnity" provision of life policy, court erred in permitting physician to testify to statement made by deceased relative to past occurrences resulting in injury. *Strommen v. P.*, 187M381, 245NW632. See Dun. Dig. 3292.

In workmen's compensation case, explanation by deceased of cause of his limping was incompetent. *Bliss v. S.*, 189M210, 248NW754. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

In workmen's compensation case, history given physician called to treat deceased employee, insofar as it included recitals of past events, was inadmissible. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3301.

Trial court properly ruled out evidence of declarations of deceased grantor whose deed had been placed in escrow to effect that contract under which it had been so placed had been abandoned and that he had resumed possession and control of premises. *Merchants' & Farmers' State Bank v. O.*, 189M528, 250NW366.

Exclusion from evidence of a self-serving letter written by plaintiff was proper. *Pettersen v. F.*, 194M265, 260NW225. See Dun. Dig. 3287a.

Admissibility of extra-judicial confessions of third parties. 16 *MinnLawRev* 437.

8. Collateral facts, occurrences, and transactions.

In an action for fraud, where the value of the assets of a financial corporation at a given time is in issue, its record books and history, both before and after the time in question, may be examined and received as bearing upon such value at the time of the transaction involved. *Watson v. G.*, 183M233, 236NW213. See Dun. Dig. 3247.

Where agreed price of automobile was in dispute, and it was seller's word against buyer's, trial court had a large discretion in admitting testimony of collateral matters tending to show which of the two conflicting stories is the more probable. *Baltrusch v. B.*, 183M470, 236NW 924. See Dun. Dig. 3228(52).

Competent evidence tending to show defendant's guilt is admissible even though it proves his participation in some other offense. *State v. Reilly*, 184M266, 238NW492. See Dun. Dig. 2459(53).

In action against city for damages growing out of car going through railing on bridge, held not error to exclude proof of other cars going on sidewalk on such

bridge. Tracey v. C., 185M380, 241NW390. See Dun. Dig. 3253, 7052.

In action to recover installment upon land contract wherein defendant counter-claimed and sought to join termination of contract by statutory notice on ground that conveyance and contract constituted a mortgage, court did not err in excluding verified complaint in action brought by defendant to enforce contract to convey other land made at same time. Jeddell v. A., 188M404, 247NW512. See Dun. Dig. 6155.

Where there is conflict in testimony of witnesses relevant to issue, evidence of collateral facts having direct tendency to show that statements of witnesses on one side are more reasonable is admissible, but this rule should be applied with great caution. Patzwald v. P., 188M557, 248NW43. See Dun. Dig. 3228(52).

In action to recover license fee from holder of gas franchise, evidence of practical construction of similar ordinance granting electricity franchise was admissible. City of South St. Paul v. N., 189M26, 248NW288. See Dun. Dig. 3405.

In action to recover for injuries received in a fall in defendant's salesroom, based on its alleged negligence in permitting waxed linoleum floor to become wet and sloppy, rendering it slippery and dangerous to users thereof, it was competent and material to prove that shortly after plaintiff slipped and fell thereon, another person slipped and almost fell at substantially same place. Taylor v. N., 192M415, 256NW674. See Dun. Dig. 3253.

Where so-called admission against interest of deceased person is not in respect to specific issue litigated, but rather indirectly or upon a collateral matter, evidence going to contradict or explain same should be admitted. Empenger v. E., 194M219, 261NW185. See Dun. Dig. 3233.

On issue of fraud, court properly admitted transactions between parties tending to prove that one was taking undue advantage of other whenever he could. Chamberlin v. T., —M—, 261NW577. See Dun. Dig. 3252.

8½. Mental operation, state of condition.

In libel case, it was competent for plaintiff to testify relative to his own mental suffering the cause and extent thereof. Thorson v. A., 190M200, 251NW177. See Dun. Dig. 5555.

9. Agency.

While agency may be proved by the testimony of the agent as a witness, evidence of the agent's statements made out of court are not admissible against his alleged principals before establishing the agent's authority. Farnum v. P., 182M338, 234NW646. See Dun. Dig. 3410(36), 149(71).

One to whom another was introduced as vice-president of a corporation held entitled to testify as to his conversation to prove agency. National Radiator Corp. v. S., 182M342, 234NW648. See Dun. Dig. 149(77).

A prima facie case of agency is sufficient to authorize receiving in evidence a statement of the agent. State v. Irish, 183M49, 235NW625. See Dun. Dig. 241.

10. Hearsay.

Proechel v. U. S. (CCA8), 59F(2d)648. Cert. den. 287 US658, 53SCR122.

Expressions of pain are admissible on the issue of physical disability, as against the objection of hearsay. Proechel v. U. S. (CCA8), 59F(2d)648. See Dun. Dig. 3292.

Testimony that deceased wife of decedent said that she had given plaintiff certain notes by having decedent husband endorse them over to plaintiff, held admissible as exception to hearsay rule. Quarfoot v. S., 189M451, 249NW668. See Dun. Dig. 3291.

Repetition of signals between engineer and his fireman, when approaching crossing, where collision occurred, was hearsay and properly excluded. O'Connor v. C., 190M277, 251NW674. See Dun. Dig. 3286.

Purpose of hearsay rule, and its only proper use, is to exclude what otherwise would be testimony untested by cross-examination and unvouched for as to trustworthiness by oath. Lepak v. L., —M—, 261NW484. See Dun. Dig. 3286.

Making of an alleged oral contract being within issues and relevant, it was prejudicial error to exclude as hearsay otherwise competent testimony of terms of such contract. Id.

11. Res gestae.

The statement of an employee, a city salesman soliciting orders, when in the course of his employment he entered the place of business of his employer near the close of his day's work, that he had fallen on the street as he came in, coupled with the statement that he was going home, was properly held competent as res gestae. Johnston v. N., 183M309, 236NW466. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

Statement of one defendant is admissible against her, but not against a co-defendant. Dell v. M., 184M147, 238 NW1. See Dun. Dig. 3421(83).

A statement of the plaintiff's client, the defendant Ada Marckel, to her father a few hours after it was claimed that a settlement was made of two causes of action brought by her against her father-in-law and co-defendant Amos Marckel, that she was to receive \$10,000 was not a part of the res gestae and was not proof of a settlement nor of the receipt of money. Dell v. M., 184M 147, 238NW1. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

Defendant's talk and conduct near commission of offense was admissible in prosecution for driving while drunk. State v. Reilly, 184M266, 238NW492. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

Testimony of conversation between deceased wife and witness wherein wife complained of her husband's drinking was admissible as part of res gestae in action by husband for wrongful death of wife. Peterson v. P., 186 M583, 244NW68. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

Where one joint adventurer sold out to another a letter written by one of them to bank acting as escrow agent held admissible as res gestae. Mid-West Public Utilities v. D., 187M580, 246NW257. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

Statement of deceased employee to another employee that he had bumped his leg held admissible as part of res gestae. Bliss v. S., 248NW754. See Dun. Dig. 3300.

Testimony as to the declaration of persons in possession of property tending to characterize their possession is admissible under res gestae doctrine. Pennig v. S., 189M262, 249NW39. See Dun. Dig. 3306.

In a collision of passenger train of one defendant with freight train of other defendant, where crossing of their roads was governed by an automatic signal system, there was no abuse of judicial discretion in excluding testimony of a declaration made by engineer of Great Northern to third parties, four or five minutes after collision; said engineer having fully testified to what he said and did prior to collision. O'Connor v. C., 190M277, 251NW674. See Dun. Dig. 3301.

Court did not err in refusing to permit plaintiff to testify to a statement he overheard his brother make more than half an hour after he set fire involved in action on fire policy. Zane v. H., 191M382, 254NW453. See Dun. Dig. 3301.

Plaintiff may not bolster up his case by testifying as to self-serving declarations made by him as a part of res gestae. Fischer v. C., 193M73, 258NW4. See Dun. Dig. 3305a.

Testimony of witness that driver of car made statement, "I just came from Rochester where I have been on business for the company," shortly after and at place of accident, was a recital of past events, not connected with accident, and was not a part of res gestae or competent to prove agency. Wendell v. S., 194M368, 260NW 503. See Dun. Dig. 3301.

11½. Articles or objects connected with occurrence or transaction.

Where car owner's son was in car, at time companion was killed, and disappeared same night, it was error not to receive such son's hat in evidence as a circumstance bearing upon who was driving car. Nicol v. G., 188M69, 247NW8. See Dun. Dig. 3258.

It was not error to receive in evidence a revolver found in path plaintiff's brother took when fleeing from scene of arson, in action on fire policy. Zane v. H., 191 M382, 254NW453. See Dun. Dig. 3258.

Use of a human skull on examination of an expert witness on question whether insured committed suicide or accidentally was shot was not improper. Backstrom v. N., 194M67, 259NW681. See Dun. Dig. 3258.

12. Documentary evidence.

The record books of banks and financial corporations subject to the supervision of the superintendent of banks, when shown to be the regular record books of such a corporation, are admissible in evidence without further proof of the correctness of the entries therein. Watson v. G., 183M233, 236NW213. See Dun. Dig. 3346.

A letter from the defendant to the plaintiff, written after suit was brought, was not erroneously received when the objection came from the defendant. Harris v. A., 183M292, 236NW458. See Dun. Dig. 3409.

Recital in lieu bond as to making of note and mortgage was evidence of such fact in action on bond. Danielski v. P., 186M24, 242NW342. See Dun. Dig. 1730a, 3204b.

In unlawful detainer against lessee, admission in evidence of unsigned pamphlet containing plaintiff's plan or organization, held error. Oakland Motor Car Co. v. K., 186M455, 243NW673. See Dun. Dig. 3363.

Records of life insurance company made and kept in usual course of business were admissible in evidence, and sufficiency of foundation therefor was for trial court. Schoonover v. P., 187M343, 245NW476. See Dun. Dig. 3346, 4741.

Court did not err in holding that there was sufficient foundation for introduction of a photograph of place of accident. Kouri v. O., 191M101, 253NW98. See Dun. Dig. 3363.

Matter of sufficiency of foundation for introduction of photograph is largely for trial court. Id.

Testimony of life insurance agent that he was familiar with instructions given him by insurer, was sufficient foundation for introduction in evidence of instruction that agents should not furnish claim blanks unless policy is in force. Kassmir v. P., 191M340, 254NW446. See Dun. Dig. 3244, 3251.

Unsigned writing of deceased widow that daughter was to have all property after her death, held inadmissible as evidence of contractual obligation, there being nothing to indicate that writing was complete or that it would not contain much more if and when completed. Hanefeld v. F., 191M547, 254NW821. See Dun. Dig. 1734.

Record of affidavits filed pursuant to §9648 was competent proof of taxes and insurance paid subsequent to foreclosure sale by holder of sheriff's certificate. Young v. P., 192M446, 256NW906. See Dun. Dig. 3355.

In a death action wherein it appeared mother of decedent was sole beneficiary, mortality tables were admissible to show life expectancy of the mother, even if

not admissible to show life expectancy of decedent, who was in ill health. *Albrecht v. P.*, 192M557, 257NW377. See Dun. Dig. 3353.

Mortality tables were admissible in evidence in action for death though evidence indicated that decedent had a weak heart. *Id.*

It was error to receive in evidence a copy of a police report made by officer called to the scene of accident. *Duffey v. C.*, 193M358, 258NW744. See Dun. Dig. 3348.

12%. Photographs.

Where defendant was permitted to introduce four photographs of two street cars after they had been jacked up to permit release of occupants of automobile, it could not be said that it was error to admit one photograph introduced by plaintiff and described by witness as "the way it looked when they were jacked up." *Luck v. M.*, 191M503, 254NW609. See Dun. Dig. 3233.

12%. Best and secondary evidence.

A naturalization certificate lost or destroyed by fire, may be proved by oral testimony where there is no court record of its issuance and no better evidence available. *Miller v. B.*, 190M352, 251NW682. See Dun. Dig. 3277, 3389.

Admissibility of parol evidence to prove a divorce. 16 MinnLawRev711.

12%. Demonstrations and experiments in court.

There was no error in permitting a sheriff to demonstrate by lying on floor position and posture of deceased's body when found. *Backstrom v. N.*, 194M67, 259NW681. See Dun. Dig. 3255.

13. Parol evidence affecting writings.

Where a contract uses the phrase to give a deed and "take a mortgage back," parol evidence is admissible in aid of construction in determining whose note was to be secured by such mortgage. *Spielman v. A.*, 183M282, 236NW319. See Dun. Dig. 3397.

Parol evidence held inadmissible to vary the terms of a written contract. *Nygaard v. M.*, 183M388, 237NW7. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

Parol evidence is inadmissible to show that a legislative bill was passed at a time other than that stated in the legislative journals. *Op. Atty. Gen.*, May 1, 1931.

In replevin where defendants counterclaimed for damages for misrepresentations of plaintiff and defendants' own agent, parol evidence was inadmissible to vary or destroy the written stipulation and release by which the cause of action against the agent was settled and joint tort-feasors discharged. *Martin v. S.*, 184M457, 239NW 219. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

An unconditional bond of a corporation, agreeing to pay to the holder therein named a stated sum of money on a fixed date, lawfully issued and sold for full value, cannot be varied by parol. *Heider v. H.*, 186M494, 243NW 699. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

It was not error to exclude an offer of proof to effect that, upon failure of a lessee to effect joint insurance, lessor took out insurance payable to himself only, purpose being to show a modification of lease and substitution of another tenant. *Wilcox v. H.*, 186M500, 243NW 711. See Dun. Dig. 3375.

Oral testimony is inadmissible to show that parties meant is an unambiguous written contract. *Burnett v. H.*, 187M7, 244NW254. See Dun. Dig. 3407.

Oral evidence was admissible to show true consideration for assignments of contract and notes reciting consideration as "value received." *Adams v. R.*, 187M209, 244NW810. See Dun. Dig. 3373.

Parol evidence is inadmissible to show that indorsement on negotiable instrument was intended to be "without recourse." *Johnson Hardware Co. v. K.*, 188M109, 246NW663. See Dun. Dig. 1012, 3368.

Extrinsic evidence is not admissible as bearing on intent of insurer where policy is unambiguous. *Wendt v. W.*, 188M488, 247NW569. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

Parol evidence is inadmissible to show that a promissory note, which by its express terms is payable on demand, is not payable until happening of a condition subsequent. *Plojzda v. J.*, 188M612, 248NW215. See Dun. Dig. 3374n(92).

Assignment of rents to mortgagee reciting consideration of one dollar contained no contractual consideration and real consideration could be shown. *Flower v. K.*, 250NW43. See Dun. Dig. 3373.

Parol evidence is admissible to show fraud in inducement of a written contract. *National Equipment Corp. v. V.*, 190M596, 252NW444. See Dun. Dig. 3376.

To be justified in setting aside a written contract and holding it abandoned or substituted by a subsequent parol contract at variance with its written terms, evidence must be clear and convincing, a mere preponderance being insufficient. *Dwyer v. I.*, 190M616, 252NW 837. See Dun. Dig. 1774, 1777.

Even if it be supposed that a signed writing is but partial integration of a contract, a parol, contemporaneous agreement is inoperative to vary or contradict the terms which have been reduced to writing. *McCraith v. D.*, 191M489, 254NW623. See Dun. Dig. 3392.

Proof of promissory fraud, inducing a written contract, cannot be made by representations contradictory of the terms of the integration. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3376, 3827.

Oral agreement of real estate mortgagee to extend time of payment to certain date in consideration of mortgagor giving chattel mortgage on crops to secure payment of taxes was not void as an attempt to vary

terms of written instrument, which instrument was within statute of frauds. *Hawkins v. H.*, 191M543, 254 NW809. See Dun. Dig. 8855.

Parol evidence rule prohibits proof of a contemporaneous parol agreement in contradiction of terms of writing. *Crosby v. C.*, 192M98, 255NW853. See Dun. Dig. 3368.

Although the name of plaintiff's husband was signed to conditional sales contract by which plaintiff procured an automobile from dealer, parol evidence was admissible to show that she was real purchaser of car. *Saunders v. C.*, 192M272, 256NW142. See Dun. Dig. 3371.

It being admitted that the conditional sales contract was blank as to price and terms when signed by the vendee, oral testimony was admissible, as between the parties to the contract, to prove that the price and terms thereafter inserted by the vendor were not those agreed to or authorized. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3370.

Cause of action being for fraud and deceit, parties were not restricted by rule that parol evidence may not be received to vary or contradict written contracts. *Nelson v. M.*, 193M455, 258NW828. See Dun. Dig. 3376.

Intent of parties to a written instrument must be gathered from words thereof after consideration of whole instrument, and evidence as to intent should not be resorted to unless there is some uncertainty or ambiguity arising from words used. *Towle v. F.*, 194M 520, 261NW5. See Dun. Dig. 3399(84).

In action on promissory note by payee, defendant could testify and defend on ground that it was orally agreed that diamond for which note was given could be returned if not satisfactory to woman. *Hendrickson v. B.*, 194M528, 261NW189. See Dun. Dig. 3377.

Parol evidence is admissible to show that an instrument was delivered to take effect and become operative only on happening of a certain contingent future event. *Id.*

A parol contemporaneous agreement is inoperative to vary or contradict terms which have been reduced to writing. *Id.*

Parol evidence to contradict or vary a writing—"Test of reasonable consequences." 18 MinnLawRev570.

Parol evidence rule and warranties of goods sold. 19 MinnLawRev725.

14. Expert and opinion testimony.

Prochel v. U. S. (CCA8), 59F(2d)648. Cert. den. 287US 658, 53SCR122.

Answer to hypothetical question propounded to a physician, held proper where the facts connecting the hypothesis with the case were later supplied. *Prochel v. U.* (CCA8), 59F(2d)648. See Dun. Dig. 3337.

In action for damages for sale to plaintiff of cows infected with contagious abortion, testimony of farmers and dairymen, familiar with the disease and qualified to give an opinion, should have been received. *Alford v. K.*, 183M158, 235NW903. See Dun. Dig. 3327(47), 3335 (58).

An expert accountant, after examination of books and records and with the books in evidence, may testify to and present in evidence summaries and computations made by him therefrom. The foundation for such evidence is within the discretion of the court. *Watson v. G.*, 183M233, 236NW213. See Dun. Dig. 3329.

In malpractice case, questions to plaintiff's expert as to what the witness would do and as to what kind of a cast he would use in treating the plaintiff, not based on any other foundation, should not be permitted to be answered. *Schmit v. E.*, 183M354, 236NW622. See Dun. Dig. 7494.

In malpractice case, court erred in permitting plaintiff's witness to testify as to what stand or action certain medical associations had taken in reference to the right of a physician to testify in a malpractice case. *Schmit v. E.*, 183M354, 236NW622. See Dun. Dig. 7494.

Expert witness in malpractice case should not have been permitted to testify as to degrees of negligence, to state that certain facts, assumed to be true on plaintiff's evidence, showed that plaintiff was highly negligent, very negligent in his treatment. *Schmit v. E.*, 183M354, 236NW622. See Dun. Dig. 7494.

In action for death in automobile collision, opinions of plaintiff's medical experts that injuries received in collision where primary cause of death were properly admitted. *Kieffer v. S.*, 184M205, 238NW331. See Dun. Dig. 3326, 3327.

Determination as to which of two successive employers was liable for occupational blindness held to be determined from conflicting medical expert testimony. *Farley v. N.*, 184M277, 238NW485. See Dun. Dig. 3326(36), 10398.

Whether a witness has qualified to give an opinion as to the value of housework is largely for the trial court's discretion or judgment. *Anderson's Estate*, 184 M560, 239NW602. See Dun. Dig. 3313(76).

The record discloses a sufficient qualification of a witness to testify as to the market value of automobile. *Quinn v. Z.*, 184M589, 239NW902. See Dun. Dig. 3335, 3336.

It was not error to sustain an objection to a question to a physician as to whether he found in examining plaintiff any symptoms of senility. *Kallusch v. K.*, 185 M3, 240NW108. See Dun. Dig. 3326, 3328.

The opinions of expert witnesses are admissible whenever the subject of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it without such assistance. *Tracey*

v. C., 185M380, 241NW390. See Dun. Dig. 3325.

Where conditions at place of automobile collision, because of darkness, were such that it was impossible for witness to describe same so as to enable jury to determine visibility of objects, it was not error to permit witness to express opinion as to whether he would have seen a certain object had it been there. *Olson v. P.*, 185M571, 242NW283. See Dun. Dig. 3315.

Expert may properly be asked to assume fact, asserted by opposing party, to be true, and then give opinion as to whether or not such fact would produce result contended for by such party. *Milliren v. F.*, 185M614, 242NW290. See Dun. Dig. 3337.

Medical expert may give opinion as to accidental and resultant injury causing premature delivery of child. *Milliren v. F.*, 185M614, 242NW290. See Dun. Dig. 3327.

Medical expert may properly give reasons for opinion expressed as to cause of death. *Milliren v. F.*, 185M614, 242NW290. See Dun. Dig. 3327.

Proper foundation held laid for admission of opinion of physician as to cause of death. *Milliren v. F.*, 185M614, 242NW546. See Dun. Dig. 3325.

For want of sufficient foundation, it was error to receive in evidence testimony of thirteen year old boy as to speed of defendant's car. *Campbell v. S.*, 186M293, 243NW142. See Dun. Dig. 3313.

In framing hypothetical questions to expert to give an opinion as to reasonable value of attorney's services, question was proper if it embraced facts which evidence might justify jury in finding, even though it did not assume all of testimony of plaintiff to be true. *Lee v. W.*, 187M659, 246NW25. See Dun. Dig. 3337.

It is legitimate cross-examination to inquire of a witness, giving opinion evidence as to damage, concerning his relations with litigant for whom he testifies, and amount of compensation to be paid him as a witness. *State v. Horman*, 188M252, 247NW4. See Dun. Dig. 3342.

Real estate agent held competent to testify as to values in eminent domain proceeding where in filing station owner sought damages occasioned by change of grade of highway by state highway department. *Apitz v. C.*, 189M205, 248NW733. See Dun. Dig. 3069, 3073.

In libel case, plaintiff could testify that he believed newspaper publication affected his family and friends. *Thorson v. A.*, 190M200, 251NW177. See Dun. Dig. 5555.

That a hypothetical question to an expert is based upon subjective symptoms goes to weight of his answer, not to its admissibility. *Johnston v. S.*, 190M269, 251NW525. See Dun. Dig. 3337.

Trial court's determination of qualification of an expert witness should stand, unless it clearly appears that knowledge and experience of witness is no aid to triers of fact. *Palmer v. O.*, 191M204, 253NW543. See Dun. Dig. 3325.

A coroner and undertaker held qualified to testify as to cause of death in action on accident policy. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3327, 3335.

Expert testimony to the effect that it was improper to treat a delirious patient in a hospital by applying restraints and administering hypodermic injections of strychnine, a stimulant, and that such treatment was responsible for patient's death, held to justify verdict. *Brase v. W.*, 192M304, 256NW176. See Dun. Dig. 3332.

Plaintiff's expert witnesses were not disqualified from testifying as to cause of death because they had not examined deceased's skull and brain, but had examined other vital organs. *Id.* See Dun. Dig. 3336.

Whether one who had not seen a farm for 12 years was qualified to testify to its value was for trial court to determine. *Peterson v. S.*, 192M315, 256NW308. See Dun. Dig. 3335.

Refusal to strike out testimony of physician that it was possible that decedent had a fracture of the skull was without prejudice where skull fracture was not included as one of facts upon which physician based his opinion that accident aggravated weak heart condition and contributed to cause death. *Albrecht v. P.*, 192M557, 257NW377. See Dun. Dig. 422(94), 3337.

Question of qualification of expert witness is one of fact for trial court whose action in this respect will not be reversed unless clearly contrary to evidence. *Backstrom v. N.*, 194M67, 259NW681. See Dun. Dig. 3335.

Opinion of expert based upon facts not in possession of hospital authorities is of no probative value upon issue of negligence of hospital in not taking steps to prevent nervous patient from jumping out of window. *Mesedahl v. S.*, 194M198, 259NW819. See Dun. Dig. 3334.

15. Nonexpert opinions and conclusions.

It is improper to permit witness to give his conclusion that he was in a position to have seen a person in a certain location had he been there. *Newton v. M.*, 186M439, 243NW684. See Dun. Dig. 3311.

In action for death of guest in automobile, driving companion of decedent having disappeared, one intimately associated with decedent in life could not give his conclusion that decedent could not drive an automobile but may only state facts and let jury draw its own conclusion. *Nicol v. G.*, 188M69, 247NW3. See Dun. Dig. 3311.

As respecting gift of notes endorsed to plaintiff, testimony of plaintiff that decedent handed notes to him and he handed them back because it was more convenient for decedent to take care of them was admissible as conclusion of witness. *Quarfot v. S.*, 189M451, 249NW668. See Dun. Dig. 3311.

A lay witness may state facts within his own knowledge and observation as to another's health, but may not express mere opinion. *Fryklind v. J.*, 190M356, 252NW232. See Dun. Dig. 3311(63).

A farmer, acquainted with a farm in his neighborhood and having an opinion as to its value, may give his opinion without further foundation. *Grimm v. G.*, 190M474, 252NW231. See Dun. Dig. 3313, 3322, 3335.

Admission of testimony as to what witness understood was meaning of conversation and words used in negotiations, though conclusions of witness was without prejudice where trial was before court without jury and court heard what words used in claimed conversation were. *Hawkins v. H.*, 191M543, 254NW809. See Dun. Dig. 3311.

In action for conversion of automobile, plaintiff could testify as to value of automobile. *Saunders v. C.*, 192M272, 256NW142. See Dun. Dig. 3322.

Proffered testimony of insurance agent that he would not have written policies had he known of the existence of a contract to destroy building in 10 years held properly excluded as conclusion of ultimate fact. *Romain v. T.*, 193M1, 258NW289. See Dun. Dig. 3311.

16. Weight and sufficiency.

Neither court nor jury may credit testimony positively contradicted by physical facts. *Liggett & Myers Tob. Co. v. D.* (CCA8), 66F(2d)678.

Testimony in conflict with the physical facts and scientific principles is lacking in all probative force. *Jacobson v. C.* (CCA8), 66F(2d)688.

Where evidence is equally consistent with two hypotheses, it tends to prove neither. *P. F. Collier & Son v. H.* (USCCA8), 72F(2d)625. See Dun. Dig. 3473.

Evidence held not to sustain a holding that defrauded vendees had received any valid extension of time of payment, or that they had accepted favors from defendants such as to prevent recovery. *Osborn v. W.*, 183M205, 236NW197. See Dun. Dig. 10100(55).

The evidence sustains the finding that the defendant's intestate promised to give the plaintiff his property upon his death in consideration of services rendered and to be rendered himself and his wife, and that services were rendered. *Simonson v. M.*, 183M525, 237NW413. See Dun. Dig. 8789a(21).

Trier of fact cannot arbitrarily disregard a witness' testimony which is clear, positive and unimpeached, and not improbable or contradictory. *First Nat. Bank v. V.*, 187M96, 244NW416. See Dun. Dig. 10344a.

Testimony of a disinterested and unimpeached witness may not be disregarded. *Allen v. P.*, 192M459, 257NW84. See Dun. Dig. 10544a.

Credibility and weight of testimony is peculiarly for the jury and in absence of substantial error, court will not interfere. *State v. Chick*, 192M539, 257NW280. See Dun. Dig. 2477, 2490.

Where plaintiff's entire case for recovery of substantial damages for personal injuries depended upon testimony of medical expert who testified that he treated plaintiff for injuries supposed to have been sustained in spring of 1930, and thereafter complaint was amended to conform to proof showing that accident occurred in November 1930, and medical witness was not recalled, there was no evidence to sustain recovery of damages awarded. *Neuleib v. A.*, 193M248, 258NW309. See Dun. Dig. 2591.

16½. Examination of witnesses.

In action for injuries received in collision of automobile and two street cars, court did not err in permitting motorman after recess of court to testify on cross-examination as to conversation with conductor, relative to his stated desire to change his testimony as to one fact. *Luck v. M.*, 191M503, 254NW609. See Dun. Dig. 9715.

Cross-examination of character witnesses as to having heard of particular acts of misconduct. 15MinnLaw Rev240.

17. Impeachment of witnesses.

Evidence brought out on cross-examination of one of defendant's witnesses, after plaintiff had rested, which was competent for the purpose of impeaching the witness, but related to a matter not in issue under the pleadings, and not presented as a part of plaintiff's case, goes only to the credibility of such witness. *Buro v. M.*, 183M518, 237NW186. See Dun. Dig. 3237a.

An unverified complaint in a previous action by this plaintiff against this and another defendant, charging them both with negligence, was admissible against plaintiff for the purpose of impeachment. *Bakkensen v. M.*, 184M274, 238NW489. See Dun. Dig. 3424.

Where attempted impeaching evidence was contained in writing of witness, writing should have been produced and shown to him. *Milliren v. F.*, 186M115, 242NW546. See Dun. Dig. 10351.

Impeaching testimony concerning statement by witness held improperly stricken out as lacking foundation. *Newton v. M.*, 186M439, 243NW684. See Dun. Dig. 10351.

Where plaintiff testified that damage to his automobile was \$625, it was error to reject defendant's offer to prove on cross-examination that plaintiff had estimated and stated his damages to be \$450. *Flor v. B.*, 189M131, 248NW743. See Dun. Dig. 3342.

Where state's main witness has by her answer taken prosecuting attorney by surprise, there was no abuse of judicial discretion in permitting state to cross-examine witness and impeach her as to truth of answer given.

State v. Bauer, 189M280, 249NW40. See Dun. Dig. 10356 (8).

Answer of a witness to an impeaching question is not evidence of a substantive fact and can be used only to discredit witness impeached. Christensen v. P., 189M548, 250NW363. See Dun. Dig. 10351g, n. 82.

Where an admitted accomplice in crime is called by state as a witness and, on cross-examination, statements contradicting his testimony for state are introduced, state may introduce other statements, made by witness at about same time, consistent with his testimony on direct examination. State v. Lynch, 192M534, 257NW278. See Dun. Dig. 10356.

In automobile accident case where police officer admitted that plaintiff had left scene of accident before he arrived, which was contrary to his statement on direct examination that he saw people involved in the collision, police report made by officer was not admissible to impeach his testimony by showing that report stated that it was based upon what others had seen at accident had told officer. Duffey v. C., 193M358, 258NW744. See Dun. Dig. 10351.

Evidence that plaintiff collected money on insurance carried on life of decedent and that she received at his death personal and real property from his estate, although not to be considered in arriving at amount of damages for his wrongful death, was admissible in refutation of testimony of plaintiff that she had no money

with which to redeem certain real property of her husband sold under foreclosure. Wright v. E., 193M509, 259NW75. See Dun. Dig. 2570b, 7193, 7202.

18. Striking out evidence.

Where plaintiff testified on direct examination that insured would have been plowing all afternoon in order to finish; and on cross-examination, she testified that her husband had told her that he was going to finish plowing that afternoon, denial of defendant's motion to strike answer given on direct examination as hearsay was not error. Pankonin v. F., 187M479, 246NW14. See Dun. Dig. 3290.

It was error to deny a motion to strike opinion evidence which cross-examination had shown to be based, insubstantial degree, upon an element improper to be considered in determining damage arising from establishment of a highway. State v. Horman, 188M252, 247NW4. See Dun. Dig. 9745.

Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to strike out all evidence as to injury to plaintiff's kidney as a result of accident in question. Orth v. W., 190M193, 251NW127. See Dun. Dig. 2528.

19. Discovery.

In automobile collision case, court properly excluded notice served by plaintiffs upon defendant requiring him to state what information he had obtained at scene of accident. Dickinson v. L., 188M130, 246NW669. See Dun. Dig. 2735.