The mother, as trustee, of children killed in a vehicle accident brought a claim for uninsured motorist benefits based on wrongful death. The claim was brought after the lapse of three years but within six years of the accident.

The issue before the court was which statute of limitations period applied to this claim: the three-year wrongful death statute of limitations urged by the defendants and insurance company or the six-year contract statute of limitations urged by the appellant trustee.

Minnesota Statutes, section 65B.43, subdivision 18, defines uninsured motorist coverage as "coverage for the protection of persons insured under that coverage who are legally entitled to recover damages for bodily injury from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run vehicles." To bring the claim, the trustee must be found to have filed the claim within the required statutory time and be "legally entitled to recover damages" under the statute. The court found the quoted phrase to be ambiguous.

The court found for the trustee by holding that Minnesota Statutes, section 65B.43, subdivision 18, "does not require an insured, who has a wrongful death claim, to comply with the three-year wrongful death limitation period. 'Legally entitled to recover damages' is read to only mean that an insured must establish fault and damages to be entitled to uninsured motorist benefits."

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 168.0422

Unconstitutional Stop of Vehicle With Special Series Plates

State v. Henning

Minnesota Supreme Court

July 31, 2003

Minnesota Statutes, sections 168.041 and 169A.60, authorize the issuance of specially marked license plates, in certain situations following impoundment of the regular plates, that indicate that an owner of the vehicle has been convicted of a DWI-related offense. In December 1995 the Minnesota Court of Appeals issued a decision in State v.Greyeagle, 541 N.W.2d 326 (Minn. App. 1995), holding that ". . . a police stop of a . . . vehicle based solely on the fact that {the} vehicle bore special statutorily issued license plates violated appellant's constitutional right to be free from suspicionless searches."

In 1997 the legislature enacted Minnesota Statutes, section 168.0422. That statute reads in pertinent part:

A peace officer who observes the operation of a motor vehicle within this state bearing special series registration plates . . . may stop the vehicle for the purpose of determining whether the driver is operating the vehicle lawfully under a valid driver's license.

Henning was stopped in a vehicle based solely on the fact that the vehicle was displaying special series plates. The district court held that section 168.0422 is unconstitutional, but the fact of the presence of the plates provided the peace officer with "reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the stop." The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that " . . . by applying for and displaying special series plates . . . , a party implicitly consents to a vehicle stop based solely on the display of those plates . . . ." and ruled the statute to be constitutional.

Henning appealed, arguing partly that the statute was an unconstitutional "attempt to override the . . . ruling in State v. Greyeagle . . . ; violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its counterpart, Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution; . . . and cannot form the sole basis for the stop of a motor vehicle."

The court found that the statute "appeared to have been passed in response to the court of appeals' decision in Greyeagle." It stated, "The primary issue is whether the statute is prohibited by the {U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions}."

The court stated, "Generally, an officer stopping a vehicle on the open road in order to check the driver's license is a 'seizure' under the Fourth Amendment. {citation omitted} An officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing in order to justify such a stop." It rejected the state's argument, essentially an argument of implied consent, that use of the vehicle "carried with it a condition giving the police the statutory authority to stop the vehicles bearing those plates without reasonable articulable suspicion . . . {and} 'destroyed' any reasonable expectation of privacy he may have had which would allow him to object to the search." The court disagreed and reversed the Court of Appeals, finding that persons other than the offending owner who gave rise to the impoundment of the original plates may be lawfully driving the vehicle and are also subject to the possibility of numerous stops that are not based on an articulable suspicion. Thus, the mere presence of the plates does not, by itself, give rise to an articulable suspicion of wrongdoing.

The court concluded that "Minn. Stat., § 168.0422 is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment {of the U.S. Constitution} and Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution . . . . We reverse the court of appeals and hereby vacate appellant's convictions . . . . We limit the retroactive application of this ruling to cases pending on the date of this decision in which the constitutionality of this statute has been properly raised in a timely fashion."

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 256B.15, subd. 2

County's Recovery from Estate for Medicaid Costs

In re Estate of Gullberg

Minnesota Court of Appeals

October 29, 2002

Walter and Jean Gullberg purchased a homestead as joint tenants. About nine years later, Walter conveyed his interest to Jean by quitclaim deed. Less than one month later he applied for and was granted medical assistance by the county, which amounted to about $40,000 by the time of his death 15 months later. More than six years later, Jean died leaving an estate consisting of the homestead valued at $119,000. The county filed a claim with the estate for its medical assistance costs, which was denied by the estate's personal representative, the Gullberg's daughter. The county brought suit to recover the costs based on this state's estate recovery statute, Minn. Stat., § 256B.15, subd. 2 (2000), which "defines 'estate' to include any property that was jointly owned at any time during the marriage.” The district court held with the personal representative and denied the claim because "federal law limits the definition of 'estate' to property and assets in which the {medical assistance} recipient had legal title at the time of death, {and} federal law preempts Minnesota's . . . statute . . . ." The county appealed and the state intervened.

The court phrased the issue as, "Did the district court err in concluding that Minnesota's estate recovery statute is preempted by federal law, thus disallowing the county's claim in its entirety?"

The federal law requires states to recover the costs of certain medical assistance from a recipient's estate but only after the death of the surviving spouse. United States Code, title 42, section 1396p, subsection (b), paragraph (4), subparagraph (A), allows a state to include in a recipient's estate, " . . . any other real and personal property . . . in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, . . . , or other arrangement."

The court found that even though Walter had conveyed legal title in the homestead, he had ". . . continued to have some legal 'interest' in the homestead because he and Jean Gullberg were still married at the time of his death" and that " . . . the law recognizes that spouses have a common ownership interest in property acquired during . . . {the marriage}, regardless of who holds title." It concluded that the state law was in conflict with the federal law, but only partially, and that the conflict did not require the state law to be preempted entirely.

The court held that the state law " . . . allows claims against a surviving spouse's estate only to the extent of the value of the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the recipient's death. This construction allows some tracing of assets back through the marriage, but restricts recovery to the value of the recipient's interest in those assets at the time of the recipient's death." The court remanded the case "to determine and reevaluate Walter Gullberg's interest in the homestead at the time of his death. The county's claim is limited to recovering only to the extent of that interest."

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 260B.130, subd. 5

Unconstitutional Denial of Jail Credit for Juveniles

State v. Garcia

Minnesota Court of Appeals

July 15, 2004

Appellant Garcia, after negotiating a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery, was designated and adjudicated as an extended jurisdiction juvenile (EJJ), and was sentenced as an adult to 58 months in prison. The adult sentence was stayed, he was placed on juvenile probation, and required to complete a residential treatment program. Within one month of completing the treatment program, Garcia violated his probation and was required to complete a residential juvenile corrections program at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Red Wing (MCF-Red Wing). Within one year after completing the corrections program, he was arrested and charged with violating his probation and seven new felonies. The court vacated the stay of execution and imposed the adult sentence of 58 months, except that it granted credit for the time he spent in jail awaiting decision on the EJJ matter. The court declined credit for the time spent at MCF-Red Wing. Garcia appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds that Minnesota Statutes 2002, section 260B.130, subdivision 5, as amended in 2000, precluded credit.

That statute reads in pertinent part:

Subd. 5. {EXECUTION OF ADULT SENTENCE.} . . . .{If} the court finds that reasons exist to revoke the stay of execution of sentence, the court shall treat the offender as an adult and order any of the adult sanctions authorized by section 609.14, subdivision 3, except that no credit shall be given for time served in juvenile facility custody prior to a summary hearing . . . . Upon revocation, the offender's extended jurisdiction status is terminated and juvenile court jurisdiction is terminated. The ongoing jurisdiction for any adult sanction, other than commitment to the commissioner of corrections, is with the adult court.

Among other arguments, Garcia argued that the subdivision was unconstitutional as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Minnesota Constitution because it has no rational basis for denying credit for EJJs while allowing credit to juveniles certified as adults. The court found the two groups of juveniles to be "similarly situated," that "to punish . . . EJJs more severely than juveniles certified as adults" for similar conduct to be not rational, and that the argued distinctions separating them are "manifestly arbitrary and fanciful and not genuine and substantial." The court further found that "there is no evident connection between the distinctive needs peculiar to EJJs as compared to certified juveniles and the prescribed remedy.”

The court held that "section 260B.135, subdivision 5, fails the Minnesota rational basis test because there is no 'reasonable connection between the actual, and not just the theoretical, effect of the challenged classification and the statutory goals.' Consequently, Garcia is entitled to receive jail credit for the time he served at MCF-Red Wing."

Minnesota Statutes, secs. 273.11, subd. 1a

Property Tax Equalization Relief

Harris v. County of Hennepin

Minnesota Supreme Court

May 27, 2004

The taxpayer, Harris, qualified for property tax relief under the equalization relief provision of Minnesota Statutes, section 278.05, subdivision 4, and the limited market value provision of Minnesota Statutes, section 273.11, subdivision 1a. The equalization relief provision was ". . . . designed to alleviate the impact of unequal assessment among similarly situated, comparable properties . . . ." The limited market value provision was ". . . designed to alleviate the impact of rapidly increasing market" . . . by placing a cap ". . . on the rate at which a taxpayer's property tax assessment can increase from one year to the next." Both parties agreed that Harris is entitled to relief from either or both; the issue involves ". . . in what order the two types of property tax relief are to be applied." The tax owed by Harris depended on which relief was first applied. The tax court concluded that equalization relief was based on the property's limited market value. The county appealed.

Minnesota Statutes, section 273.11, subdivision 1a, reads in pertinent part:

Subd. 1a. {LIMITED MARKET VALUE.}

. . . .

For purposes of the assessment/sales ratio study . . ., and the computation of state aids . . ., market value and net tax capacities determined under this subdivision . . ., shall be used.

Harris argued ". . . the legislature intended to employ limited market values in both assessment/sales ratio studies and state aid calculations." The court stated that the provision ". . . does not clearly and unambiguously lead us to conclude that limited market values are the basis for equalization proceedings." The court felt that an equally plausible interpretation was that the legislature could have intended that limited market values would be used for an assessment/sales ratio study ". . . as it relates to the computation of state aids." The latter interpretation would allow use of limited market values for only the state aids calculation.

After considering and discussing applicable canons of construction, the history and constitutional underpinnings of equalization relief, the effect of applying one provision before another, and the purposes of equalization, the court held ". . . when a taxpayer qualifies for both equalization relief under Minn. Stat., § 278.05, subd. 4, and limited market value relief under Minn. Stat., § 273.11, subd. 1a, the taxpayer's equalization reduction must first be applied to the property's actual market value before its limited market value is determined." Reversed.

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 317A.241, subd. 1

Nonprofit Corporation's Authority to Appoint

Special Litigation Committee

Janssen v. Best & Flanagan

Minnesota Supreme Court

May 22, 2003

Janssen is a member of a nonprofit corporation that administers a pension plan, the Minneapolis Police Relief Association (MPRA), which made a bad investment in a company that 2lost the MPRA about $15,000,000. Janssen and others brought a derivative suit on behalf of MPRA alleging malpractice by Best & Flanagan regarding the investment. Janssen did not enjoy an attorney-client relationship with Best & Flanagan so the suit required MPRA to join as a plaintiff. MPRA appointed a special counsel to investigate and determine whether to join in the suit. The special counsel recommended that MPRA not join in the lawsuit. MPRA brought a motion to dismiss the suit "under the principle of law that the court should defer to the business judgment of {special counsel}, MPRA's special litigation committee."

Along with other issues, MPRA and Janssen disagreed on the authority of MPRA to appoint a special litigation committee, which in this case consisted of the special counsel. The court framed the issue as, "whether the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act prohibits a nonprofit corporation's board of directors from establishing an independent committee with authority to make decisions about derivative lawsuits . . . ." Minnesota Statutes, section 317A.241, subdivision 1, reads:

Subdivision 1. {GENERALLY.} A resolution approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the board may establish committees having the authority of the board in the management of the business of the corporation to the extent provided in the resolution. Committees are subject at all times to the direction and control of the board.

The court found the statute to be ambiguous as subject to two reasonable interpretations: as interpreted by MPRA, "subject at all times to the direction and control of the board" only applies to the possibility, not the necessity, of board control or, as interpreted by Janssen, the phrase denies a committee sufficient independence to profit from the deference afforded the committee by a court under the business judgment rule. The court examined contemporaneous legislative history and compared the Nonprofit Corporations Act with the Business Corporation Act and found that insufficient legislative intent could be discerned from those factors. The court based its decision on considerations of the consequences of a particular interpretation, particularly:

(1) the burden on the court system;

(2) the similar characteristics of nonprofit corporations and for-profit corporations to justify similar treatment;

(3) the common law tradition; and

(4) the existence of a corporation's incidental powers.

The court held, " . . . the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act does not prohibit corporations from appointing independent committees with the authority to decide whether the corporation should join a member's derivative suit."

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 487.08, subd. 5

Unconstitutional Jurisdiction of Judicial Officer

State v. Harris

Minnesota Supreme Court

August 21, 2003

Defendant Harris was convicted of two counts of murder following a district court trial presided over by a judicial officer appointed by the chief judge of the district under the authority of Minnesota Statutes, section 487.08, subdivision 5, which reads in pertinent part:

Subd. 5. {SUBJECT TO CHIEF JUDGE'S AUTHORITY.} All judicial officers are subject to the administrative authority and assignment power of the chief judge of the district as provided in section 484.69, subdivision 3. They shall be learned in the law, and shall hear and try matters as assigned to them by the chief judge.

. . . .

No objections to the judicial officer presiding over the trial were raised during the trial or during sentencing. Harris appealed, arguing that the judicial officer did not have jurisdiction to hear and try his case and that assignment of a judicial officer to a felony-level trial was unconstitutional as violating article VI, section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution, which reads:

Section 1. The judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals, if established by the legislature, a district court and such other courts, judicial officers and commissioners with jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may establish.

The court considered the history of judicial officers who were authorized for and appointed by county courts beginning in 1971, ostensibly to continue some of the limited judicial work done by the municipal courts who were mostly abolished that year in favor of county courts. The position was later abolished but personnel occupying those positions and the positions in certain counties, including St. Louis County in which Harris was tried, were "grandfathered" in. At some later time, some judicial officers began to be appointed to preside over felony-level cases and other district court-level matters.

The court stated that its first question to be determined was, "Did the legislature intend to grant authority in the chief judge of a judicial district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer?" After reviewing the pertinent statutory language and the fact that by 1980 the legislature was aware of the fact that judicial officers were being used as "the functional equivalent of judges," the court concluded that the legislature did intend to grant this authority.

The court framed the critical issue as "Does granting authority to the chief judge of a district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer, including a felony jury trial, violate the Minnesota Constitution?"

The court examined the legislature's constitutional authority to establish additional courts and found that it could establish courts (1) in the constitution's original language, only below the level of the Supreme Court, and (2) after the constitution was amended in 1956 and later, only below the level of the district court. The court likened the level of the inferior court to the level of a judicial officer and stated: "If an inferior court is one that has limited and specified rather than general jurisdiction, then it naturally follows that for a judicial officer to remain inferior to the district court under article VI, the judicial officer must have limited and specified jurisdiction. In other words, the judicial officer must be a person having limited rather than general jurisdiction." However, the judicial officer "presided over this entire felony trial and was utilized as the functional equivalent of a district court judge."

The court noted that the judicial officer in this case was neither elected nor appointed by the governor as required by article VI, sections 7 and 8, and did not enjoy the salary protection of article VI, section 5, so "Therefore . . . met none of the requirements and received none of the protections of a district judge."

The court held, ". . . the legislative grant of authority to the chief judge of a judicial district to assign any district court matter to a judicial officer pursuant to Minn. Stat., § 487.08, subd. 5, violates Article VI, Section 1 of the Minnesota Constitution, because the grant of authority runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that judicial officers be inferior in jurisdiction to the district court."

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 609.035, subd. 2, para. (f)

12-Person Jury for Felony-level Sentence

State v. Blooflat

Minnesota Court of Appeals

November 18, 2003

Blooflat was convicted of driving a vehicle after his driver’s license was canceled and four counts of driving while impaired, each offense a gross misdemeanor, under circumstances subjecting Blooflat to consecutive sentences exceeding one year under Minnesota Statutes (1999 Supplement), section 609.035, subdivision 2, paragraph (g) (now paragraph (f)). That paragraph states in pertinent part “. . . the court shall sentence the offender to serve consecutive sentences for the offenses, notwithstanding the fact that the offenses arose out of the same course of conduct.” Blooflat was denied a 12-person jury and was convicted by a six-person jury on all counts. He appealed.

After finding that driving after cancellation is not a lesser included offense of driving while impaired, the court considered the issue of whether paragraph (g) (now (f)) is . . . “unconstitutional because it subjects non-felony defendants to felony-like sentences, while only providing six-person juries?”

Minnesota Constitution, article 1, section 6, entitles a person accused of committing a felony to a trial before a 12-member jury.

The court found a previous case authoritative, State v. Baker, 590 N.W.2d 636 (Minn.1999), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the laws enacted to establish a level of crime called enhanced gross misdemeanors allowing six-member juries to impose confinement sentences for more than one year. The court in Baker found that these laws deprived a defendant subject to a felony-level sentence of the right to trial before a 12-person jury. Baker determined that felonies had historically been defined as any crime for which the accused may be imprisoned for more than one year. Regarding Blooflat, the court said: “By mandating consecutive sentences, the legislature effectively created two-year sentences for a single behavioral incident while continuing to label the crimes gross misdemeanors, so as to deny defendants their constitutional right to a 12-person jury. This, as Baker notes, is expressly forbidden.”

The court held, “. . . the legislature overstepped its constitutional authority in enacting . . . subd. 2(g).” It stated further, “. . . we conclude . . . subd. 2(g) (Supp.1999) is unconstitutional because, by mandating consecutive sentences, it deprives defendants facing more than one year incarceration of their constitutional right to a 12-person jury.”

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 609.375, subd. 2b

Prosecution Prerequisite for Failure to Pay Child Support

State v. Nelson

Minnesota Court of Appeals

November 18, 2003

The state charged Nelson with five counts of felony nonsupport of a child for continuing nonsupport violations for five different periods of time. Each period exceeded 180 days, in violation of Minnesota Statutes, section 609.375, subdivision 2a, with the last period being July 1, 2001, through January 24, 2002. Minnesota Statutes, section 609.375, subdivision 2b, became effective August 1, 2001. That subdivision reads:

Subd. 2b. {ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN CONTEMPT ORDER AS PREREQUISITE TO PROSECUTION.} A person may not be charged with violating this section unless there has been an attempt to obtain a court order holding the person in contempt for failing to pay support or maintenance under chapter 518. This requirement is satisfied by a showing that reasonable attempts have been made at service of the order.

Although the state had obtained at least two contempt orders against Nelson before filing the criminal complaint, it had not attempted to obtain a contempt order for each of the 180-day periods. The district court ruled against Nelson’s motion to dismiss reasoning that “the statute did not contain a time limitation . . . to obtain a court order, and . . . sufficient probable cause existed because the attempt {to obtain a court order} requirement had been satisfied by previous contempt orders.” The district court eventually found Nelson guilty on all five counts and Nelson appealed.

The court affirmed the convictions for the four counts for violations occurring during the 180-day periods before the effective date of section 609.375, subdivision 2b. With regard to the last count, the court framed the issue, “as a prerequisite to prosecution . . . from criminal nonsupport . . ., does Minn. Stat., § 609.375, subd. 2b (2002) require that the state attempt to obtain a contempt order for failure to pay support during the same time period specified in the criminal complaint?”

The court agreed with the state that subdivision 2b did not expressly require the prosecution to obtain a court order for contempt during the same 180-day period of continuing nonsupport violations but “we conclude that, read in context, the subdivision reasonably could require this consistency and therefore is ambiguous.”

The court noted the relationship of section 609.375 with the civil contempt proceedings of chapter 518, the marriage dissolution chapter, and concluded that the provision, “could reasonably be interpreted as requiring that the contempt-order attempt embrace the same time period of nonpayment of child support as the criminal complaint.” The court also felt that since the felony nonsupport provision may be violated with continuing violations over a specific time period, 180 days, and that the civil contempt provisions are time specific, subdivision 2b could reasonably be interpreted as having a time-specific requirement. Finally, the court examined legislative history to conclude that compliance with child-support orders takes precedence over prosecution.

The court held, “. . . Minn. Stat., § 609.375, subd. 2b, requires the state, as a prerequisite to prosecution, to attempt to obtain a contempt order for failure to pay child support during the time period specified in the complaint.” Nelson’s conviction on the fifth count was reversed.

Minnesota Statutes, sec. 611.17, subd. 1, para. (c)

Indigent Defendant's Right to Counsel

State v. Tennin

Minnesota Supreme Court

February 12, 2004

Tennin was charged with prostitution; was found to be indigent and eligible for public defender assistance; paid the $50 co-payment for this assistance as required by Minnesota Statutes, section 611.17, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), as amended in 2003; received public defender assistance; and challenged the constitutionality of the statute as violating her right to counsel.

The court found that the 2003 amendment to the public defender assistance co-payment provision "(1) . . . created a co-payment obligation upon appointment of the public defender rather than at disposition of the case; (2) deleted the express language establishing a judicial waiver of the co-payment; and (3) increased the amount of the co-payment." The court also noted that the amendment provided that "Collection of the co-payment may be made through the . . . Revenue Recapture Act."

The court analyzed the U. S. Supreme Court's decision in an Oregon case, Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974), which stated that "The fact that an indigent who accepts state-appointed legal representation knows that he might someday be required to repay the cost of these services does not impair the defendant's right to counsel." Fuller, 417 U.S. at 53. However, the court framed the issue as ". . . does Minn. Stat., § 611.17, subd. 1(c) . . . exempt persons who remain indigent or for whom repayment of the co-payment would work a manifest hardship?" It stated that two components of the federal court's analysis of the Oregon co-payment statute were "relevant to our analysis: (1) the Oregon statute's express language that a court could not order a defendant to pay legal expenses unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them, or if hardship would result if repayment was ordered; and (2) the Oregon statute's provision for a defendant to petition the court at any time for remission of the payment costs, which the court may grant if payment 'will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family.'" The court stated that the Oregon statute was applicable to those indigent defendants who later became able to pay for the legal representation and, thus, those persons were not denied their right to counsel. In further comparing the co-payment statutes, the court concluded that Minnesota's provision did not provide, either expressly or impliedly, for a judicial waiver of the co-payment but that the legislature intended that the co-payment be collected through the Revenue Recapture Act and other means, that insufficient protection existed "against imposing co-payments on defendants who remain indigent and those for whom repayment would cause a manifest hardship, and that the provision was not ambiguous and did not provide room for other, discretionary construction.”

The court held, ". . . Minn. Stat., § 611.17, subd. 1(c) (Supp. 2003) is unconstitutional" and " . . . , as amended, violates the right to counsel under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions."