Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
    Minnesota Statutes, secs. 116B.01 and 116B.02, subds. 4 and 5 

Election Ballots
    Minnesota Statutes, sec. 204B.41

Preemption of Medical Assistance Lien, Assignment, and Subrogation Laws
   Minnesota Statutes, secs. 256B.042, subd. 1; 256B.056, subd. 6;
   and 256B.37, subd. 1 

Spousal Signature Requirement to Convey Homestead 
   Minnesota Statutes, sec. 507.02

Defining Value of Homestead Exemption
   Minnesota Statutes, sec. 510.02

Calculating Child Support Payments
   Minnesota Statutes, sec. 518.551, subd. 5, para. (f)

Patterned Sex Offender Sentence Enhancement
   Minnesota Statutes, sec. 609.108, subd. 2

Overlapping Criminal Acts in Pattern Harassment
   Minnesota Statutes, sec. 609.749, subd. 5

Unconstitutional Restriction on Minors in the Courtroom
   Minnesota Statutes, sec. 631.04

Minnesota Environmental Rights Act

The city of Northfield adopted a rezoning ordinance that, in effect, allowed a large commercial retail establishment to build a store near the city's central business district. The district is listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Some city residents brought suit arguing, inter alia, that the construction would result in a violation of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA), Minnesota Statutes, chapter 116B. The residents argued that (1) the act protects ". . . natural resources located within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction" under Minnesota Statutes, sections 116B.01 and 116B.02, subdivision 5, (2) the buildings in the city's central business district are protected historical resources, (3) historical resources, while not defined in MERA, are a type of natural resource listed in Minnesota Statutes, section 116B.02, subdivision 4, and are protected under MERA, and (4) the "new . . . store 'is likely to materially adversely affect' those buildings," in violation of Minnesota Statutes, section 116B.02, subdivision 5, because of the resulting adverse economic disadvantages to the central business district merchants.

The court of appeals noted that the term "historical resources" is not defined in MERA and, therefore, is ambiguous. The court found that the state supreme court had previously identified certain criteria to be considered when determining what constituted historical resources, which primarily addressed "buildings or other places, which we note are the criteria for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places." In determining the legislature's intent for MERA and similar laws "to accomplish environmental ends, not economic ones," the court concluded:

In addition, the court found the appellants' argument alleging essentially a resulting decline in the central business district was "too attenuated as a matter of law" because allowing MERA to be based:

Election Ballots

Following the death of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party nominee for the U. S. Senate, Erlandson and others brought a petition for relief under Minnesota Statutes, section 204B.44, clause (d), alleging that certain election officials did not properly "administer the instructions, the absentee ballots and the supplemental ballots for the general election scheduled for November 5, 2002." The vacancy occurred after absentee ballots had been mailed and "after the 16th day before the general election" under Minnesota Statutes, section 204B.41, which states:

The court held a hearing on October 31, 2002, and issued an order (with opinion to follow) which stated in pertinent part related to Minnesota Statutes, section 204B.41:

(Full text of the order may be found in the appendix. In the absence of the opinion, it is unclear whether or not the court found any statutory language to be unconstitutional or ambiguous, or merely interpreted it. When the opinion is issued, the revisor's office will review it and, if constitutionality, ambiguity, or other legal problems are identified, we will supplement this report.)

Minnesota Supreme Court

Martin settled a personal injury suit brought against alleged third-party tortfeasors on behalf of her disabled son, Hoff, for $220,000. About six years earlier, to be eligible to receive medical assistance pursuant to Minnesota Statutes, section 256B.056, subdivision 6, Martin, as Hoff's authorized representative, assigned to the state all of Hoff's rights to payment for medical care from any third party liable for Hoff's injuries. The state filed a lien on Hoff's causes of action arising out of the accident that caused Hoff's disability. The lien was for medical costs already paid through state medical assistance and for future medical assistance benefits. The state asserted its medical assistance lien under Minnesota Statutes, section 256B.042, subdivision 1, and a claim for subrogation under Minnesota Statutes, section 256B.37, subdivision 1, to obtain a portion of the settlement proceeds as reimbursement for its expenses in providing Hoff with medical care, which by that time exceeded $600,000.

The district court granted Martin's motion to dismiss the state's claim against the settlement proceeds finding that "Hoff's right to recover medical expenses was completely assigned to the state, leaving Martin . . . with no right to collect for medical expenses. Hoff's remaining rights to recover included all of his claims for personal injury damages except for medical expenses. Martin settled . . . remaining claims . . . for $220,000. The state released . . . defendants . . . , apparently relying only on its lien and subrogation rights to recover medical expenses paid on Hoff's behalf . . . . [T]he state was not entitled to . . . the settlement funds . . . . [T]he state's lien and subrogation rights were preempted by federal law."

The state appealed. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, holding generally that state statutes did not conflict with the federal Medicaid scheme, that the statutes were not preempted by federal law, and that the state's lien and subrogation claims were valid.

On further appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in a 4-3 decision, reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the district court for further action.

The court phrased the issues as "whether Minnesota's medical assistance lien, assignment, and subrogation statutes are preempted by the federal anti-lien statute."

The federal anti-lien law provides that ". . . no lien may be imposed against the property of any individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance paid . . . ." The court found the language to be unambiguous and found that it operated in harmony with other federal Medicaid provisions to accomplish ". . . dual objectives: first, protection of the recipient's limited assets from encroachment by the state for reimbursement for medical expenses paid; second, requiring recovery and reimbursement from third parties liable for the recipient's medical expenses that were paid by Medicaid."

The state's medical assistance lien statute, Minnesota Statutes, section 256B.042, subdivision 1, reads in pertinent part:

The court found that the federal anti-lien statute prohibited a lien being placed on a medical assistance recipient's property before the recipient's death and held that "section 256B.042, . . . is preempted to the extent that it allows a lien for medical assistance paid to be placed on a medical assistance recipient's cause of action before a recipient's death.

The state's assignment statute, Minnesota Statutes, section 256B.056, subdivision 6, reads in pertinent part:

The court found that to interpret "for the costs of medical care" to modify "third party liable" would allow the state to recover proceeds for more than just the costs of medical care allowed under the federal law. To resolve this conflict, the court held that the phrase, instead, modified "all proceeds" in order for the state statute to conform with federal law (i.e., ". . . all proceeds . . . for the costs of medical care . . . ."). The court held "when a medical assistance recipient has a cause or causes of action against potentially liable third parties for his injuries, the medical assistance assignment statute grants to the state an assignment right to all claims for medical care, but it does not grant an assignment right to any other claims or the recovery therefrom."

The state's subrogation statute, Minnesota Statutes, section 256B.37, subdivision 1, reads in pertinent part:

Since the statute is not limited to causes of action to recover medical assistance costs, the court felt that "allowing a subrogation right outside of the state's assigned right to medical expenses would be an obstacle to the purposes of the federal Medicaid scheme." The court held "that the state subrogation provision is preempted to the extent that it allows the state to assert a subrogation right against causes of action or settlements for other than medical expenses."

Spousal Signature Requirement to Convey Homestead

Newton entered into a contract for deed to purchase a house. About two years later she married Witkowski, after which they resided in the house as their homestead. Subsequently, they separated and Newton began divorce proceedings. Before the divorce was final, Newton borrowed $116,600 and executed a promissory note and a mortgage on the property as security for the note. Witkowski did not sign the note or the mortgage and was not named as a mortgagor. Newton used $55,034.74 to pay off the contract for deed and the remaining $61,565.26 to pay closing costs and personal expenses. Subsequently, Newton failed to make mortgage payments and Wells Fargo (appellant) brought an action against Newton and Witkowski for money owed, for property foreclosure, and for a declaration that the appellant's claim is superior to that of any other claimant.

Wells Fargo contended that the money was owed under a purchase money mortgage, which is an exception to the signature requirement for married persons to make a valid conveyance of the homestead under Minnesota Statutes, section 507.02. That section states, in part: "If the owner is married, no conveyance of the homestead, except a mortgage for purchase money unpaid thereon, . . . shall be valid without the signatures of both spouses." The district court disagreed, finding in favor of Newton and Witkowski that the mortgage was not a purchase-money mortgage and was invalid because it was not signed by both Newton and Witkowski.

The court found the statute to be ambiguous and phrased the issue as a determination whether Minnesota Statutes, section 507.02 "applies to a mortgage when funds obtained with the mortgage are used partly to refinance a contract for deed and partly to pay personal expenses." The court of appeals stated that the policy objective of the statute is to "ensure a secure homestead for families" and to protect against "the alienation of the homestead without the willing signatures of both spouses" but not to preserve the property against even just "demands for unpaid purchase money."

The court concluded that under the statute "to the extent that the mortgage Newton signed secures amounts other than the unpaid purchase price under Newton's contract for deed, the mortgage is invalid. But to the extent that the mortgage secures the $55,034.74 unpaid purchase price under the contract for deed, it is a mortgage for purchase money unpaid on the homestead. Therefore, the spousal-signature requirement in Minn. Stat. ..., section 507.02, does not apply to that portion of the mortgage, and the mortgage is a valid mortgage for $55,034.74 even though it was not signed by Witkowski."

Defining Value of Homestead Exemption

In a creditor-debtor dispute, the district court interpreted the value of the debtor's homestead under the homestead-exemption statute as being its fair market value. Baumann (the debtor) appealed, arguing that "value of the homestead exemption" referred to the debtor's equity in the property. The homestead-exemption statute, Minnesota Statutes, section 510.02, reads in pertinent part:

The court found the statute to be susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation and, therefore, ambiguous.

After an analysis of statutes related to the homestead-exemption statute, the legislative history of the statute, and public policy reasons, the court held that its analysis supported the meaning of "value of the homestead exemption" as referring to "the value of the debtor's equity in the property," not the property's fair market value.

John Svenningsen, appellant, appealed the decision of the district court regarding his child support obligation. The appellant incurred a debt of more than $130,000 in student loans for medical school. The divorce agreement provided that the debt would be considered in determining the appellant's support obligation under Minnesota Statutes, section 518.551, subdivision 5, paragraphs (d) through (f). The appellant's salary increased to $116,160 per year and the parties agreed that the support should increase but that a downward departure from the guidelines was warranted because of the debt. However, the parties disagreed over the duration of the downward departure.

Minnesota Statutes, section 518.551, subdivision 5, paragraph (f), reads in pertinent part:

The court stated that "it is unclear exactly what the phrase 'further departure' references." Before 1986, the sentence including the phrase "further departure" was preceded by a sentence that read "The court shall order child support in accordance with the guidelines and any departure therefrom." Even though the preceding sentence had been removed, the appellant argued the two words assume some other departure from the guidelines has occurred, not the case in this instance. Therefore, since this downward departure is not a "further departure," the 18-month duration limitation does not apply.

The court found that case law and commentators had consistently ignored the word "further" and had held that a downward departure for private debt was limited to 18 months, even when that was "the only basis for departure." The court considered the word superfluous and held that paragraph (f) "prohibits any departure below the guidelines based on a consideration of private debts to exceed 18 months."

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Grossman was convicted of six felony counts, including first-degree criminal sexual conduct, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years' imprisonment. The trial court judge found that Grossman qualified under Minnesota Statutes, section 609.108, subdivision 1, as a patterned sex offender and, pursuant to the sentencing enhancement provisions of subdivision 2 of that statute, sentenced Grossman to 40 years' imprisonment. The Minnesota Supreme Court had previously held that the findings required in subdivision 1 of the statute to support a determination that a convicted person is a patterned sex offender need only be based on a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1993). Minnesota Statutes, section 609.108, subdivision 2, reads in pertinent part:

Grossman appealed, claiming the sentence violated due process in light of the U. S. Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The court in Apprendi held:

The court found that the sentencing court necessarily had to make findings under subdivision 1, under a preponderance of the evidence standard, to impose a penalty greater than authorized by the jury's verdict, which was based on the reasonable doubt standard. In addition, the court relied on the Apprendi analysis that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" Under this analysis, it is irrelevant whether the findings are traditionally those made by a sentencing court and the court concluded:

Minnesota Court of Appeals

Richardson was convicted of eight felony counts of patterns of harassing conduct toward four victims. Minnesota Statutes, section 609.749, subdivision 5, paragraph (b), reads in pertinent part ". . . a 'pattern of harassing conduct' means two or more acts . . . that violate the provisions of . . . [various statutes prohibiting criminal acts]…."

The defendant argued that, at most, the statute allowed for only three counts to be charged because each pattern of harassing conduct required at least two distinct unlawful acts separate from two other, different acts used as the basis for each additional count of harassing conduct. The trial court convicted the defendant of eight counts of pattern harassment, consisting of (1) counts that had as a basis an underlying act that "overlapped" against one victim, in which, for example, the second underlying act of one count was used as the first underlying act of a second count against the same victim and (2) counts that "overlapped" against more than one victim in which, for example, an underlying criminal act was used to form not only a basis for a count against one victim but also a basis for a count against a second victim.

The court of appeals determined that the phrase "two or more acts" was "open to at least two interpretations" and, thus, ambiguous. Because it was interpreting a penal statute, the court stated that it must "strictly construe . . . [the ambiguous language] in favor of Richardson." The court concluded that each count required "at least two separate and discrete criminal acts" as a basis for the offense as to each victim, so that a specific criminal act used in forming the basis for one count of pattern harassment could not "overlap" and be used to also form the basis for another count of pattern harassment directed at the same victim. However, the same criminal act perpetrated against two or more individuals may be used as a basis for two or more counts and the specific act "would not be overlapping when applied to each victim."

Minnesota Supreme Court

Based on Minnesota Statutes, section 631.04, which was originally enacted in 1891, the trial court refused to allow two minors to remain in the courtroom during Lindsey's trial for murder. The minors were neither parties nor witnesses, nor did they have any other direct interest in the trial. Minnesota Statutes, section 631.04, reads in pertinent part:

Lindsey sought a new trial under his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The court found that "it was error for the trial court to rely on section 631.04 to exclude the two children from the courtroom" but concluded that "the regulation of spectators in the courtroom during a criminal trial is procedural and has nothing to do with the substantive aspects of the offense or punishment," and that "the values sought to be protected by a public trial were in fact protected."

The court held that "the exclusion of two children on the facts presented did not violate Lindsey's right to a public trial."

However, the court also held that Minnesota Statutes, section 631.04, "unconstitutionally encroaches upon a judicial function in violation of the separation of powers doctrine."